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Letter of Transmittal 
Santiago, Chile 
9 October 1949 
Sir, 
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an essay entitled "The 
Economic Development of Latin America and its principal problems", 
by Professor Raul Prebisch. 
In creating the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Economic 
and Social Council stated that one of its main purposes would be to "make 
or sponsor . . . investigations and studies of economic and technologi-
cal problems and developments within territories of Latin America . . .". 
Having regard to the importance of fostering research along these lines, 
and in agreement with the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the 
Department of Economic Affairs, Mr. David Owen, the undersigned Exec-
utive Secretary has sponsored the preparation, of a paper on "The Eco-
nomic Development of Latin America and its principal problems", which 
has been written by Professor Raul Prebisch. 
It is hoped that its publication may arouse further interest in economic 
investigations in the Latin-American countries and that it will prompt 
the writing of similar works which aim at finding a solution to the basic 
problems confronting Latin America, the correct presentation of which 
has become a matter of immediate concern. 
I have the honour to be, Sir, 
Your obedient servant, 
GUSTAVO MARTINEZ CABANAS 
Executive Secretary 
MR. TRYGVE LIE 
Secretary-General of the 
United Nations 




In Latin America, reality is undermining the out-dated schema of the 
international division of labour, which achieved great importance in the 
nineteenth century and, as a theoretical concept, continued to exert con-
siderable influence until very recently. 
Under that schema, the specific task that fell to Latin America, as part 
of the periphery of the world economic system, was that of producing food 
and raw materials for the great industrial centres. 
There was no place within it for the industrialization of the new 
countries. It is nevertheless being forced upon them by events. Two world 
wars in a single generation and a great economic crisis between them 
have shown the Latin-American countries jtheir opportunities, clearly 
pointing the way to industrial activity. 
The academic discussion, however, is far from ended. In economics, 
ideologies usually tend either to lag behind events or to outlive them. 
It is true that the reasoning on the economic advantages of the inter-
national division of labour is theoretically sound, but it is usually for-
gotten that it is based upon an assumption which has been conclusively 
proved false by facts. According to this assumption, the benefits of tech-
nical progress tend to be distributed alike over the whole community, 
either by the lowering of prices or the corresponding raising of incomes. 
The countries producing raw materials obtain their share of these bene-
fits through international exchange, and therefore have no need to indus-
trialize. If they were to do so, their lesser efficiency would result in their 
losing the conventional advantages of such exchange. 
The flaw in this assumption is that of generalizing from the particular. 
If by "the community" only the great industrial countries are meant, it 
is indeed true that the benefits of technical progress are gradually dis-
tributed among all social groups and classes. If, however, the concept 
of the community is extended to include the periphery of the world econ-
omy, a serious error is implicit in the generalization. The enormous bene-
fits that derive from increased productivity have not reached the periphery 
in a measure comparable to that obtained by the peoples of the great 
industrial countries. Hence, the outstanding differences between the 
standards of living of the masses of the former and the latter and the mani-
fest discrepancies between their respective abilities to accumulate capital, 
since the margin of saving depends primarily on increased productivity. 
Thus there exists an obvious disequilibrium, a fact which, whatever its 
explanation or justification, destroys the basic premise underlying the 
schema of the international division of labour. 
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Hence, the fundamental significance of the industrialization of the 
new countries. Industrialization is not an end in itself, but the principal 
means at the disposal of those countries of obtaining a share of the bene-
fits of technical progress and of progressively raising the standard of liv-
ing of the masses. 
The Latin-American countries are thus faced with an immense general 
problem, embracing a series of minor ones which must be defined before 
embarking on the long task of research and practical measures which 
will be necessary if there is a firm intention to solve the problems. 
It would be premature, in this initial report, to draw conclusions that 
would have only the doubtful value of an improvization. Admittedly 
much remains to be done in the Latin-American countries, both in learn-
ing the facts and in their proper theoretical interpretation. Though 
many of the problems of these countries are similar, no common effort 
has ever been made even to examine and elucidate them. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the studies published on the economy of Latin-
American countries often reflect the points of view or the experience of 
the great centres of world economy. Those studies cannot be expected 
to solve problems of direct concern to Latin America. The case of the 
Latin-American countries must therefore be presented clearly, so that 
their interests, aspirations and opportunities, bearing in mind, of course, 
the individual differences and characteristics, may be adequately inte-
grated within the general framework of international economic co-opera-
tion. 
The task ahead is thus considerable and the responsibility heavy. To 
deal with it methodically, it would be necessary to begin with a pre-
liminary examination of the principal problems as a whole, at the same 
time bringing out certain general considerations suggested by direct con-
tact with the economic life of Latin America. Such is the purpose of this 
report. 
The industrialization of Latin America is not incompatible with the 
efficient development of primary production. On the contrary, the avail-
ability of the best capital equipment and the prompt adoption of new 
techniques are essential if the development of industry is to fulfil the 
social objective of raising the standard of living. The same is true of 
the mechanization of agriculture. Primary products must be exported 
to allow for the importation of the considerable quantity of capital goods 
needed. 
The more active Latin America's foreign trade, the greater the pos-
sibility of increasing productivity by means of intensive capital forma-
tion. The solution does not lie in growth at the expense of foreign trade, 
but in knowing how to extract, from continually growing foreign trade, 
the elements that will promote economic development. 
If reasoning does not suffice to convince us of the close tie between 
economic development and foreign trade, a few facts relating to the situa-
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tion today will make it evident. The economic activity and level of em-
ployment in the majority of the Latin-American countries are consider-
ably higher than before the war. This high level of employment entails 
increased imports of consumer goods, both non-durable and durable, 
besides those of raw materials and capital goods, and very often exports 
are insufficient to provide for them. 
This is evident in the case of imports and other items payable in 
dollars. There are already well-known cases of scarcity of that currency 
in certain countries, despite the fact that the amount of dollars supplied 
by the United States to the rest of the world in payment of its own im-
ports was considerable. In relation to its national income, however, the 
import coefficient of the United States has, after a persistent decline, 
arrived at a very low level (not over 3 per cent). It is, therefore, not sur-
prising that, notwithstanding the high income level of the United States, 
the dollar resources thus made available to the Latin-American countries 
seem insufficient to pay for the imports needed for their intensive 
development. 
It is true that as European economy recovers, trade with that continent 
can profitably be increased, but Europe will not supply Latin America 
with more dollars unless the United States increases its import coefficient 
for European goods. 
This, then, is the core of the problem. It is obvious that if the above-
mentioned coefficient is not raised, Latin America will be compelled to 
divert its purchases from the United States to those countries which pro-
vide the exchange to pay for them. Such a solution is certainly very 
dubious, since it often means the purchase of more expensive or unsuit-
able goods. 
It would be deplorable to fall back on measures of that kind when a 
basic solution might be found. It is sometimes thought that, by reason 
of the enormous productive capacity of the United States, that country 
could not increase its import coefficient for the purpose of providing 
the basic solution to this world problem. Such a conclusion cannot be 
substantiated without a prior analysis of the factors that have caused the 
United States steadily to reduce its import coefficient. These factors are 
aggravated by unemployment, but can be overcome when it does not 
exist. One can understand that it is of vital importance, both to Latin 
America and the rest of the world, that the United States achieve its 
aim of maintaining a high level of employment. 
It cannot be denied that the economic development of certain Latin-
American countries and their rapid assimilation of modern technology, 
in so far as they can utilize it, depend to a very large extent upon foreign 
investment. The implications involved render the problem far from 
simple. The negative factors include the failure to meet foreign financial 
commitments during the great depression of the nineteen thirties, a 
failure which, it is generally agreed, must not be allowed to happen 
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again. Fundamentally the problem is the same as that referred to in the 
preceding paragraph. The servicing of these foreign investments, unless 
new investments are made, must be paid for by means of exports in the 
same currency and, if these do not show a corresponding increase, in 
time the same difficulties will arise again. They will be the greater if 
exports fall violently. The question thus arises whether, pending that 
basic solution, it would not be wiser to direct investments toward such 
productive activities as would, through direct or indirect reduction of 
dollar imports, permit the regular servicing of foreign obligations. 
Here one must beware of dogmatic generalizations. To assume that 
the meeting of foreign commitments and the proper functioning of the 
monetary system depend upon nothing more than a decision to obey 
certain rules of the game is to fall into an error involving serious con-
sequences. Even when the gold standard was in operation in the great 
centres, the countries of the Latin-American periphery had great difficulty 
in maintaining it, and their monetary troubles frequently provoked con-
demnation from abroad. The more recent experiences of the large coun-
tries have brought a better understanding of some aspects of the situation. 
Great Britain, between the two wars, encountered difficulties somewhat 
similar to those which arose and continue to arise in the Latin-American 
countries, which have never taken kindly to the rigidity of the gold 
standard. That experience doubtless helps to bring about a better under-
standing of the phenomena of the periphery. 
The gold standard has ceased to function, as in the past, and the man-
agement of currency has become even more complex in the periphery. 
Can all these complications be overcome by a strict application of sound 
rules of monetary behaviour? Sound rules for these countries are still 
in the making. Here there arises another vital problem; that of utilizing 
individual and collective experience to find a means of harmoniously 
fitting monetary action into a policy of regular and intensive economic 
development. 
Let this not be interpreted as meaning that the classic teachings are of 
no value. If they do not provide positive rules, they at least show what 
cannot be done without impairing the stability of the currency. The 
extremes to which inflation has gone in Latin America show that mone-
tary policy was not based upon these teachings, since some of the larger 
Latin-American countries increased circulation to a greater extent than 
did those countries which had to meet enormous war expenditure. 
There is yet another aspect of the problem of dollar shortage. It is 
true that, as already stated, a high level of employment increases imports. 
But it is also a fact that an excessive monetary expansion has often un-
duly increased the pressure on the balance of payments, thus leading 
to the use of foreign exchange for purposes not always compatible with 
economic development. 
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These facts must be taken into account in an objective analysis of the 
effects of the inflationary increase on the process of capitalization. It 
must, however, be admitted that, in most of the Latin-American coun-
tries, voluntary savings are not sufficient to cover the most urgent capital 
needs. In any case, monetary expansion does not bring about an increase 
in the foreign exchange reserves necessary for the importation of capital 
goods; it merely redistributes income. It must now be determined whether 
it has led to a more active capital formation. 
The point is a decisive one. The raising of the standard of living of 
the masses ultimately depends on the existence of a considerable amount 
of capital per man employed in industry, transport and primary pro-
duction, and on the ability to use it well. 
Consequently, the Latin-American countries need to accumulate an 
enormous amount of capital. Several have already shown their capacity 
to save to the extent of being able to finance a large part of their in-
dustrial investments through their own efforts. Even in this case, which 
is exceptional, capital formation has to overcome a strong tendency 
towards certain types of consumption which are often incompatible with 
intensive capitalization. 
Nevertheless, it does not appear essential to restrict the individual 
consumption of the bulk of the population, which, on the whole, is too 
low, in order to accumulate the capital required for industrialization and 
for the technical improvement of agriculture. An immediate increase in 
productivity per man could be brought about by well-directed foreign 
investments added to present savings. Once this initial improvement has 
been accomplished, a considerable part of the increased production can 
be devoted to capital formation rather than to inopportune consumption. 
How are sufficient increases in productivity to be achieved? The ex-
perience of recent years is instructive. With some exceptions, the rise in 
employment necessitated by industrial development was made possible 
by the use of men whom technical progress had displaced from primary 
production and other occupations, especially certain comparatively poorly 
paid types of personal services, and by the employment of women. The in-
dustrial employment of the unemployed, or ill-employed, has thus meant 
a considerable improvement in productivity and, consequently, where 
other factors have not brought about a general lowering of productive 
efficiency, a net increase in national income. 
The great scope for technical progress in the field of primary produc-
tion, even in those countries where it has already been considerable, to-
gether with the perfecting of existing industries, could contribute, to 
national income, a net increase that would provide an ever-increasing 
margin of saving. 
All this, however, especially in so far as it is desired to reduce the need 
for foreign investments, presupposes a far greater initial capitalization 
than is usually possible with the type of consumption of certain sectors 
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of the community, or the high proportion of national income absorbed, 
in some countries, by fiscal expenditure, which makes no direct or in-
direct contribution to national productivity. 
It is, in fact, a demonstration of the latent conflict existing in these 
countries between the desire to assimilate, quickly, ways of life which 
the technically more advanced countries adopted step by step as their 
productivity increased, and the need for capitalization without which 
this increase in productivity could not be achieved. 
For the very reason that capital is scarce, and the need for it great, its 
use should be subjected to a strict standard of efficacy which has not 
been easy to maintain, especially where industries have developed to 
meet an emergency. There is, however, still time to correct certain de-
viations and, above all, to avoid them in the future. 
In order to achieve this, the purpose of industrialization must be clearly 
defined. If industrialization is considered to be the means of attaining 
an autarchic ideal in which economic considerations are of secondary 
importance, any industry that can produce substitutes for imports is 
justifiable. If, however, the aim is to increase the measurable well-being 
of the masses, the limits beyond which more intensive industrialization 
might mean a decrease in productivity must be borne in mind. 
Formerly, before the great depression, development in the Latin-Ameri-
can countries was stimulated from abroad by the constant increase of 
exports. There is no reason to suppose, at least at present, that this will 
again occur to the same extent, except under very exceptional circum-
stances. These countries no longer have an alternative between vigorous 
growth along those lines and internal expansion through industrializa-
tion. Industrialization has become the most important means of expan-
sion. 
This does not mean, however, that primary exports must be sacrificed 
to further industrial development. Exports not only provide the foreign 
exchange with which to buy the imports necessary for economic develop-
ment, but their value usually includes a high proportion of land rent, 
which does not involve any collective cost. If productivity in agriculture 
can be increased by technical progress and if, at the same time, real wages 
can be raised by industrialization and adequate social legislation, the 
disequilibrium between incomes at the centres and the periphery can 
gradually be corrected without detriment to that essential economic 
activity. 
This is one of the limits of industrialization which must be carefully 
considered in plans of development. Another concerns the optimum size 
of industrial enterprises. It is generally found in Latin-American coun-
tries that the same industries are being attempted on both sides of the 
same frontier. This tends to diminish productive efficiency and so mili-
tates against fulfilling the social task to be accomplished. The defect is 
a serious one, which the nineteenth century was able to attenuate con-
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siderably. When Great Britain proved, with facts, the advantages of in-
dustry, other countries followed suit. Industrial development, however, 
spurred by active competition, tended towards certain characteristic types 
of specialization which encouraged profitable trade between the various 
countries. Specialization furthered technical progress and the latter made 
possible higher incomes. Here, unlike the case of industrial countries 
by comparison with those producing primary products, the classic ad-
vantages of the division of labour between countries that are equal, or 
nearly so, followed. 
The possibility of losing a considerable proportion of the benefits of 
technical progress through an excessive division of markets thus con-
stitutes another factor limiting the industrial expansion of these coun-
tries. Far from being unsurmountable, however, it is a factor which 
could be removed with mutual benefit by a wise policy of economic inter-
dependence. 
Anti-cyclical policies must be included in any programmes of economic 
development if there is to be an attempt, from a social point of view, 
to raise real income. The spread of the cyclical fluctuations of the large 
centres to the Latin-American periphery means a considerable loss of 
income to these countries. If this could be avoided, it would simplify the 
problem of capital formation. Attempts have been made to evolve an 
anti-cyclical policy, but it must be admitted that, as yet, but little light 
has been thrown on this subject. Furthermore, the present dwindling of 
metallic reserves of several countries means that, in the event of a reces-
sion originating abroad, they would not only be without a plan of de-
fense but would lack means of their own to carry out the measures de-
manded by the circumstances. 
The principal problems having been set forth in this first part of the 
report, the following sections will be devoted to some of their outstand-
ing aspects, which must be discussed both on account of their intrinsic 
importance and of the need for carrying out systematic research on them.1 
1 The obstacles in the way of carrying out such a task in Latin America are well 
known. The greatest difficulty is perhaps the small number of economists capable of an 
original approach to the specific problems of these countries. For various reasons, it has 
not been possible to supply the lack by training an adequate number of young men of 
high intellectual calibre. Considerable progress has been made by sending them to the 
great European and American universities, but this is not sufficient. One of the most 
conspicuous deficiencies of general economic theory, from the point of view of the 
periphery, is its false sense of universality. 
It could hardly be expected that the economists of the great countries, absorbed by 
serious problems of their own, should devote preferential attention to a study of those 
of Latin America. The study of Latin America's economic life is primarily the concern 
of its own economists. Only if this regional economy can be explained rationally and 
with scientific objectivity, can effective proposals for practical action be achieved. 
It must not be thought, however, that this desire springs from an exclusive individu-
alism. On the contrary, Latin-American economists can only accomplish it on the basis 
of a sound knowledge of the theories expounded in the great countries with their wealth 
of universal truths. An intelligent knowledge of the ideas of others must not be confused 
with that mental subjection to them from which we are slowly learning to free ourselves. 
II. The advantage of technical progress and the countries 
of the periphery-
It was stated in the preceding section that the advantages of technical 
progress have been mainly concentrated in the industrial centres and 
have not directly extended to the countries making up the periphery 
of the world's economic system. The increased productivity of the in-
dustrial countries certainly stimulated the demand for primary products 
and thus constituted a dynamic factor of the utmost importance in the 
development of Latin America. That, however, is distinct from the 
question discussed below. 
Speaking generally, technical progress seems to have been greater in 
industry than in the primary production of peripheral countries, as 
was pointed out in a recent study on price relations.1 Consequently, if 
prices had been reduced in proportion to increasing productivity, the 
reduction should have been less in the case of primary products than in 
that of manufactures, so that as the disparity between productivities in-
creased, the price relationship between the two should have shown a 
steady improvement in favour of the countries of the periphery. 
Had this happened, the phenomenon would have been of profound 
significance. The countries of the periphery would have benefited from 
the fall in price of finished industrial products to the same extent as the 
countries of the centre. The benefits of technical progress would thus 
have been distributed alike throughout the world, in accordance with 
the implicit premise of the schema of the international division of labour, 
and Latin America would have had no economic advantage in industrial-
izing. On the contrary, the region would have suffered a definite loss, 
until it had achieved the same productive efficiency as the industrial 
countries. 
The above supposition is not borne out by the facts. As can be seen in 
the indexes of table 1, the price relation turned steadily against primary 
production from the 1870's until the Second World War. It is regrettable 
that the price indexes do not reflect the differences in quality of finished 
products. For this reason, it was not possible to take them into account 
in these considerations. With the same amount of primary products, only 
63 per cent of the finished manufactures which could be bought in the 
1860's were to be had in the 1930's; in other words, an average of 58.6 
per cent more primary products was needed to buy the same amount of 
i "Post War Price Relations in Trade Between Under-developed and Industrialized 
Countries", document E/CN.l/Sub.S/W.5. 
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finished manufactures.2 The price relation, therefore, moved against the 
periphery, contrary to what should have happened had prices fallen as 
costs decreased as a result of higher productivity. 
TABLE 1 
Ratio of prices of primary commodities to those of manufactured goods 
(average import and export prices, according to data of the Board of trade) 
Base: 1876-80 = 100 
Periods 
Amount of finished products 
obtainable for a given 














Source: "Post War Price Relations in Trade 
Between Under-developed and Industrialized 
Countries", document E/CN.1/Sub.3/W.5,23 Feb-
ruary 1949. 
During the expansion of the last war, as in the case of all cyclical ex-
pansions, the relation moved in favour of primary products. Now, how-
ever, although there has not been a recession, a typical readjustment is 
taking place, with the result that prices of primary products are losing 
their former advantage. 
The pointing out of this disparity between prices does not imply 
passing judgment regarding its significance from other points of view. 
It could be argued, on grounds of equity, that the countries which strove 
to achieve a high degree of technical efficiency were in no way obliged to 
share its fruits with the rest of the world. Had they done so, they would 
not have reached their enornjous capacity to save, without which it 
might well be asked whether technical progress would have achieved 
the intense rhythm which characterizes capitalist development. In any 
case the productive technique exists and is at the disposal of those with 
2 According to the report already quoted. The figures for the thirties go only as far 
as 1938 inclusive. The data given are the Board of Trade's average price indexes for 
British imports and exports representative of world prices for raw materials and manu-
factured goods respectively. 
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the capacity and perseverance to assimilate it and increase their own 
productivity. All that, however, is outside the scope of this report. The 
purpose is to emphasize a fact which, despite its many implications, is 
not usually given the importance it deserves when the significance of 
the industrialization of the peripheral countries is discussed. 
Simple reasoning on the phenomenon in question brings us to the 
following considerations: 
First. Prices have not fallen concomitantly with technical progress, 
since, while on the one hand, costs tended to decrease as a result of higher 
productivity, on the other, the income of entrepreneurs and productive 
factors increased. When income increased more than productivity, prices 
rose instead of falling. 
Second. Had the rise in income, in the industrial centres and the peri-
phery, been proportionate to the increase in their respective productivity, 
the price relation between primary and manufactured products would 
have been the same as if prices had fallen in strict proportion to pro-
ductivity. Given the higher productivity of industry, the price relation 
would have moved in favour of the primary products. 
Third. Since, as we have seen, the ratio actually moved against primary 
products in the period between the 1870's and the 1930's, it is evident 
that in the centre the income of entrepreneurs and of productive factors 
increased relatively more than productivity, whereas in the periphery 
the increase in income was less than that in productivity. 
In other words, while the centres kept the whole benefit of the technical 
development of their industries, the peripheral countries transferred to 
them a share of the fruits of their own technical progress.3 
8 "Post War Price Relations in Trade between Under-developed and Industrialized 
Countries", document E/CN.1/Sub.3/W.5, pp. 115-116: 
"A long-term deterioration in terms of trade, such as has been found to obtain for 
primary producers over a long period, may be an effect of differences in the rate of 
increase in productivity in the production of primary commodities and manufactured 
articles, respectively. If we can assume that the deteriorating terms of trade for under-
developed countries reflect a more rapid increase of productivity in primary commodities 
than Of manufactured goods, the effect of worsened terms of trade would, of course, be 
less serious. It would merely mean that, to the extent that primary commodities are 
being exported, the effects of increased productivity are being passed on to the buyers 
of primary articles in the more industrialized countries. Although statistical data on 
differential rates of increase in productivity of primary production in under-developed 
countries, and production of manufactured articles in industrialized countries, are almost 
entirely lacking, this explanation of the long-term changes in terms of trade which were 
observed in this study may be dismissed. There is little doubt that productivity increased 
faster in the industrialized countries than primary production in under-developed 
countries. This is evidenced by the more rapid rise in standards of living in industri-
alized countries during the long period covered, from 1870 to the present day. Hence, 
the changes observed in terms of trade do not mean that increased productivity in 
primary production was passed on to industrialized countries; on the contrary, they 
mean that the under-developed countries maintained, in the prices which they paid for 
their imported manufactures relative to those which they obtained for their own pri-
mary products, a rising standard of living in the industrialized countries, without 
receiving, in the price of their own products, a corresponding equivalent contribution 
towards their own standards of living." 
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Before explaining the reason for this phenomenon, which is so im-
portant to Latin America, it would be well to consider how the effects 
of increased productivity are transmitted. 
For this purpose, an illustrative example is presented in table 2, in 
which it is assumed that the indexes of productivity, per man, are greater 
in industry than in primary production. For the sake of simplification, 
both are supposed to make an equal contribution to the finished product. 
TABLE 2 
Illustration of the distribution of the benefits of technical progress 
between the centre and the periphery 
Ratio 
Primary Industrial Total (1) (2) 
production production production* xlOO xlOO 
(1) (2) (?) P) V) 
Assumption: Productivity in-
creases in accordance with the 
following indexes: 
First case: Costs decrease as pro-
ductivity rises and prices de-
crease with costs, without any 
rise in income: 
Second case: Costs decrease as in 
the first case, but income in-
creases as follows: 
Changes in prices following the 







































a Figures relate to the finished products. See explanation on page 18. 
b Part of the price representing value added by the manufacturing process. 
It has been assumed in the first case that, with an increase in produc-
tivity, from 100 to 120 in agriculture and from 100 to 160 in industry, 
incomes of entrepreneurs and productive factors do not rise, but costs 
fall. If prices are reduced pari passu with costs, the decline in the price 
of primary products is less than that in the case of manufactured goods, 
as is shown by the corresponding indexes. Consequently, the ratio be-
tween the two moves, in favour of the primary products, from 100 to 116.7. 
This is precisely the ratio that would have allowed the increase in final 
production to be shared equally by the primary producers and the in-
dustrial centres. In fact, if there is an increase in primary productivity 
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from 100 to 120, and if, as has just been seen, 100 primary products can 
now be exchanged for 116.7 manufactured articles, it means that primary 
producers can now obtain 140 instead of 100 of those products, or, in 
other words, that the increase has been the same as in the case of final 
production, an increase obviously obtained by the industrial producers 
also. 
There is a marked difference in these results when, in the second case, 
incomes are altered. It is assumed that, in industry, the increase in income 
is greater than the increase in productivity and that, in primary produc-
tion, both increases are equal. As a result, the price ratio moves against 
primary production, from 100 to 93.3, so that primary products, despite 
the increase in productivity from 100 to 120, can buy only 112.0 final 
products, as against 100 previously. On the other hand, a similar calcu-
lation shows that industrial producers can now obtain 168 final products, 
as compared with the 100 they bought before. 
It should be noted that, whereas the primary producers can increase 
their acquisitions of final products less than they increase productivity, 
industrial producers benefit more than they should in relation to the 
increase in their productivity. 
It follows, logically, that if the increase in income in primary produc-
tion had been assumed to be less than, instead of equal to, the increase 
in productivity, the price ratio would have dropped still further against 
the primary producers. 
The deterioration of 36.5 per cent in the price ratio between the 
eighteen seventies and the nineteen thirties suggests the possibility of a 
phenomenon of that kind. 
In short, if, in spite of greater technical progress in industry than in 
primary production, the price relation has moved against the latter in-
stead of in its favour, it would seem that the average income, per capita, 
has risen more in industrial centres than in the producer countries of 
the periphery. 
The existence of this phenomenon cannot be understood, except in 
relation to trade cycles and the way in which they occur in the centres 
and at the periphery, since the cycle is the characteristic form of growth 
of capitalist economy, and increased productivity is one of the main 
factors of that growth. 
In the cyclical process of the centres, there is a continuous inequality 
between the aggregate demand and supply of finished consumer goods. 
The former is greater than the latter in the upswing and lower in the 
downswing. 
The magnitude of profits and their variations are closely bound up 
with this disparity. Profits rise during the upswing, thus tending to cur-
tail excess demand by raising prices; they fall during the downswing, 
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tending, in that case, to counteract the effect of excess supply by lower-
ing prices. 
As prices rise, profits are transferred from the entrepreneurs at the 
centre to the primary producers of the periphery. The greater the com-
petition and the longer the time required to increase primary production 
in relation to the time needed for the other stages of production, and 
the smaller the stocks, the greater the proportion of profits transferred 
to the periphery. Hence follows a typical characteristic of the cyclical 
upswing: prices óf primary products tend to rise more sharply than 
those of finished goods, by reason of the high proportion of profits trans-
ferred to the periphery. 
If this be so, what is the explanation of the fact that, with the passage 
of time and throughout the cycles, income has increased more at the 
centre than at the periphery? 
There is no contradiction whatsoever between the two phenomena. 
The prices of primary products rise more rapidly than industrial prices 
in the upswing, but also they fall more in the downswing, so that in the 
course of the cycles the gap between prices of the two is progressively 
widened. 
Let us now look at the explanations of this inequality in the cyclical 
movement of prices. It was seen that profits rise in the upswing and de-
crease in the downswing, thus tending to offset the disparity between 
demand and supply. If profits could fall in the same way in which they 
rose, there would be no reason whatsoever for this unequal movement. 
It occurs precisely because they cannot fall in that way. 
The reason is very simple. During the upswing, part of the profits are 
absorbed by an increase in wages, occasioned by competition between 
entrepreneurs and by the pressure of trade unions. When profits have to 
be reduced during the downswing, the part that had been absorbed by 
wage increases loses its fluidity, at the centre, by reason of the well-known 
resistance to a lowering of wages. The pressure then moves toward the 
periphery, with greater force than would be the case if, by reason of the 
limitations of competition, wages and profits in the centre were not 
rigid. The less that income can contract at the centre, the more it must 
do so at the periphery. 
The characteristic lack of organization among the workers employed 
in primary production prevents them from obtaining wage increases 
comparable to those of the industrial countries and from maintaining 
the increases to the same extent. The reduction of income—whether 
profits or wages—is therefore less difficult at the periphery. 
Even if there existed as great a rigidity at the periphery as at the 
centre, it would merely increase the pressure of the latter on the former, 
since, when profits in the periphery did not decrease sufficiently to offset 
the inequality between supply and demand in the cyclical centres, stocks 
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would accumulate in the latter, industrial production contract, and 
with it the demand for primary products. Demand would then fall to 
the extent required to achieve the necessary reduction in income in the 
primary producing sector. The forced readjustment of costs of primary 
production during the world crisis illustrates the intensity that this move-
ment can attain. 
The greater ability of the masses in the cyclical centres to obtain rises 
in wages during the upswing and to maintain the higher level during 
the downswing and the ability of these centres, by virtue of the role they 
play in production, to divert cyclical pressure to the periphery (causing 
a greater reduction of income of the latter than in that of the centres) 
explain why income at the centres persistently tends to rise more than 
in the countries of the periphery, as happened in the case of Latin 
America. 
That is the clue to the phenomenon whereby the great industrial 
centres not only keep for themselves the benefit of the use of new tech-
niques in their own economy, but are in a favourable position to obtain 
a share of that deriving from the technical progress of the periphery. 
III. Latin America and the high productivity of the 
United States 
The United States is now the principal cyclical centre of the world, 
as was formerly Great Britain. Its economic influence over other coun-
tries is obvious, and in that influence, its enormous increase in produc-
tivity has played a vital part. It has profoundly affected foreign trade 
and, through its variations, the rate of economic development of the 
rest of the world and the international distribution of gold. 
The Latin-American countries, with their high coefficient of foreign 
trade, are extremely sensitive to such economic repercussions. An ex-
amination of the implications of the phenomenon and the problems 
it presents is therefore opportune. 
It is a well-known fact that, in the United States, prices have not fallen 
in proportion to the increase in productivity as the recent research of 
Mr. Fabricant has clearly shown. During the period covered by that re-
search—the forty years preceding the Second World War—manufactur-
ing production costs declined regularly and persistently. The movement 
of prices did not follow this pattern at all. The increase in productivity 
was not reflected in prices but in income. Wages and salaries rose as 
real costs fell. This did not account, however, for all the benefits of pro-
ductivity, as an appreciable part of it was passed on in the form of a 
shorter working day. 
The increase in income arising out of higher productivity sooner or 
later extends to all phases of economic life through the well-known 
process, which need not be recalled here. By virtue of that same process 
income has also increased in activities in which technical progress has 
been insignificant or non-existent, as in certain types of services. In some 
social groups the increase was very slow; meanwhile the rest of the com-
munity enjoyed advantages which, as the necessary adjustment took 
place, had to be yielded to the former. This transfer, however, was usually 
offset by new increases in wages resulting from still higher productivity. 
This fact is pointed out as a good example of the type of adjustment 
to which the gradual industrialization of Latin America will necessarily 
give rise. As productivity increases with industrialization, wages will 
rise, thus causing a comparative increase in the prices of primary prod-
ucts. In this way, as its income rises, primary production will gradually 
obtain that share of the benefits of technical progress which it would 
have enjoyed had prices declined. As in the case of the lagging social 
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groups mentioned above, it is evident that such adjustment will mean 
a loss of real income in the industrial sectors, which will, however, be 
limited by the import coefficient; but in the long run, that loss can be 
well compensated by the benefit of subsequent technical developments. 
As mentioned before, since prices do not keep pace with productivity, 
industrialization is the only means by which the Latin-American coun-
tries may fully obtain the advantages of technical progress. 
Another solution had, nevertheless, been found by the classical theory. 
If the advantages of technique were not passed on through prices, they 
would be extended to the same degree by the raising of income. We 
have just seen that this is precisely what happened in the United States, 
as well as in the other great industrial centres. It did not, however, occur 
in the rest of the world. It would have required, throughout the world, 
the same mobility of factors of production as that which characterized 
the broad field of the internal economy of the United States. That 
mobility is one of the essential assumptions of the theory. In fact, how-
ever, a series of obstacles hampered the easy movement of productive 
factors. Doubtless the high wages paid in the United States, as compared 
with those in the rest of the world, would have attracted large masses 
to that country, with a very adverse effect upon wages, tending to reduce 
the difference between them and those in the rest of the world. 
Thus the observance of one of the essential rules of the classic game 
would have resulted in a considerable lowering of the standard of living 
of the United States, as compared with the levels actually achieved. 
It is easily understandable that the protection of this standard of liv-
ing, attained by great effort, should have prevailed over the uncertain 
advantages of an academic concept. But the classic rules of the game 
form an indivisible whole and, if one is eliminated, the others cannot 
logically serve as absolute standards governing relations between the 
centres and the periphery. 
This point is the more worthy of consideration in that one of the 
consequences of the technical progress of the United States, so much 
greater than that of the rest of the world, has been another important 
departure from the rules. 
As previously stated, the import coefficient of the United States has 
become extremely low, not more than 3 per cent. In 1929 it was 5 per 
cent. The decline is not new, but one of long standing. During the last 
hundred years, national income increased about two and a half times 
more than imports. 
This phenomenon is largely explained by technical progress. Para-
doxical as it may seem, increased productivity contributed to the strength-
ening of the United States' protective tariff policy, after that country 
had reached the stage of economic maturity. The explanation is simple. 
Over a given period of time, technical progress does not affect all in-
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dustries equally. When higher wages resulting from the increased pro-
ductivity of the more advanced industries are extended to the less ad-
vanced, the latter lose the advantage which had enabled them to com-
pete with foreign industries paying lower wages. The significance of this 
factor will be appreciated from the fact that wages are twice or two and 
a half times as high in the United States as in Great Britain. Thus, tariff 
protection has been necessary for industries more efficient than their 
foreign competitors, but whose level of productivity is lower than the 
average for their own country. For instance, despite the great improve-
ment of agricultural technique, some of the important branches of 
agriculture needed protection as a result of their relatively high incomes 
as compared with those of foreign competitors. 
England, when it was the economic dynamic centre, followed a diame-
trically opposed policy. If, however, the clock could be put back, it is by 
no means certain that it would abide by the same policy and disrupt 
its economy. The United States is a powerful and well-integrated eco-
nomic entity and has become so largely through its own deliberate effort, 
the great significance of which is recognized. One cannot overlook, how-
ever, the fact that this brought about, for the rest of the world, conditions 
incompatible with the functioning of international economy in the 
same way as before the First World War, when the British centre strictly 
observed the rules of the game in the fields of monetary policy and foreign 
trade. 
It is under these new conditions of international economy, that the 
process of industrialization has begun to develop in Latin America. The 
fundamental problem lies in adaptation to these conditions—in so far 
as they cannot be altered—while seeking new rules in keeping with the 
new circumstances. 
Until that happens, and possibly with slight intervals, a persistent 
tendency toward disequilibrium will prevail. It is due, fundamentally, 
to the following fact: while, as we have seen, the import coefficient of 
the United States has been declining, the dollar imports of the Latin-
American countries are tending to increase, thus compelling them to 
take defensive measures to lessen the effects. There are several reasons 
for this: 
First: since technical progress has been greater in the United States 
than anywhere else, the demand for the capital goods necessary for 
industrialization is preferentially made upon that country. 
Second: technical development continuously manifests itself in the form 
of new products which, by modifying existing ways of life, assume the 
character of new necessities, of new ways of spending the income of 
Latin America, generally substituting them for the previous forms of 
domestic expenditure. 
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Third: in addition to those products which have undeniable technical 
advantages, there are others toward which demand is diverted by the 
considerable persuasive power of advertising. New tastes are created 
which must be satisfied by imports, to the prejudice of those which could 
be satisfied locally. 
That it is not possible to reduce the import coefficient at the centre 
on the one hand, and to allow it to increase freely in the periphery on 
the other, under the influence of the above factors, Was fully proved by 
the serious events of the nineteen thirties. We now have sufficient per-
spective to understand their significance and to learn the lesson that 
they teach. One other fact must first be mentioned. 
It has already been stated that the industrialization of Latin America, 
if wisely carried ,out, will open the way to a considerable increase in 
national income, by giving more productive employment to vast numbers 
of the population at present engaged in occupations of low productivity. 
It can now be seen that the rise in income so far achieved has accentu-
ated the influence of those factors on the demand for dollar imports. 
The greater the rise in income in these countries, therefore, the greater 
their need to import. This brings us once again to the problem of dollar 
shortage, which demands special attention. 
IV. The problem of the dollar shortage and its repercus-
sions in Latin America 
As soon as the symptoms of a dollar shortage begin to appear, the 
natural reaction is to look back at the not very distant past when, as 
shown in tables 3 and 4 and charts 1 and 2, increasingly large quantities 
of gold were being concentrated in the vaults of the United States. Before 
the First World War, that country held 26.5 per cent of the world re-
serves; by the beginning of the Second World War, this figure had in-
creased to 50.9 per cent; and though at the end of hostilities it had 
fallen to 36.5 per cent, the United States again increased its share, which 
in 1948 comprised about half the world reserves. 
The dollar shortage means that the United States does not purchase 
merchandise and services, or lend money, in an amount sufficient to cover 
the needs, justified or not, of other countries. This entails recourse to 
monetary reserves: dollars must be sold or gold sent to the United States. 
Though this dwindling of reserves is not slow to give rise to monetary 
disturbances, the attraction of gold toward the main cyclical centre, if 
persistent, is not simply a monetary problem; it is the manifestation of 
a much deeper dynamic phenomenon related to the rhythm of economic 
growth of the various countries and the way in which it occurs. 
Depending on the type of its own growth, the action of the principal 
centre may, through cyclical fluctuations, take the form either of a per-
sistent tendency to expel gold that flows to it, and thus stimulate the 
economic development of the rest of the world, or that of a tenacious 
retention of gold, to the detriment of the dynamic forces of the rest of 
the world. The British cyclical centre was of the first type. So was the 
new principal cyclical centre before 1929. In the nineteen thirties, how-
ever, the second type prevailed, and the countries of the rest of the world 
were obliged to adjust their relationship with that centre in order that 
they might be able to continue developing, in spite of the unfavorable 
influence of the centre and its great absorption of metal. 
The Latin-American countries shared, with the others, the hardships 
of the nineteen thirties. It is understandable, therefore, that, faced with 
the symptoms of another dollar shortage, they should examine the past, 
as they can now do in clearer perspective, to discover whether the same 
factors which were at work then are again coming into force. 
Those factors relate, on the one hand, to the repercussions on the rest 
of the world of the contraction and expansion of the principal cyclical 
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centre and, on the other, to the marked reduction of its import coefficient 
and other foreign payments. 
TABLE 3 
Gold reserves of the United States and the rest of the world 
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Rest of world 
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Percentage 





1923 7,190 1,102 6,088 41.5 8,558 58.5 14,646 
1924 7,698 1,303 6,395 42. 8,001 58. 15,196 
1925 7,493 1,124 6,369 41.8 8,862 58.2 15,231 
1926 6,912 1,833 5,079 32.4 10,553 67.6 15,632 
1927 6,733 2,823 31910 24. 12,330 76. 16,240 
1928 6,342 2,234 4,108 24.1 12,919 75.9 17,027 
1929 6,603 2,337 4,3)76 25. 13,122 75. 17,498 
1930 7,153 1,417 5,736 30.9 12,792 69.1 18,528 
1931 6,858 338 6,520 34. 12,649 66. 19,169 
1932 6,848 -325 7,173 35.5 13,029 64.5 20,202 
1933 6,792 -856 7,648 37.7 12,627 62.3 20,275 
1934 8,236 -522 8,758 40. 13,109 60. 21,867 
1935 10,124 444 9,680 44.5 12,024 55.5 21,704 
1936 11,258 819 10,439 45.8 12,277 54.2 22,716 
1937 12,760 1,208 11,552 48. 12,493 52. 24,045 
1938 14,592 1,579 13,013 50.9 12,531 49.1 25,544 
1939 17,800 2,714 15,086 59.1 10,414 41.9 25,500 
1940 22,043 3,578 18,465 63.1 10,535 36.9 29,000 
1941 22,761 3,335 19,426 64.7 10,574 35.3 30,000 
1942 22,738 3,891 18,757 54.3 15,743 45.6 34,500 
1943 21,981 5,158 16,823 47.5 16,577 52.5 35,400 
1944 20,631 5,316 15,315 42.1 20,985 57.9 36.300 
1945 20,083 6,558 13,525 36.5 23,4.75 63.5 37,000 
1946 20,706 5,453 15,253 40.6 22,247 59.4 37,500 
1947 22,868 4,331 18,537 48.6 19,563 51.4 38,100 
1948 24,004 4,672 19,332 50. 19,268 50. 38,600 
Note. The amounts representing net short-term dollar assets belonging to the countries of the rest 
of the world have been deducted from the gold holdings of the United States, since they represent 
monetary assets belonging to these countries and not to the United States. In view of the magnitude 
of these assets at certain times, the effects of the adjustment are considerable. In 19417, for instance, 
the United States would have held 60 per cent of the world's gold, had not the exclusion of the 
above-mentioned dollar assets reduced that figure to 48.6 per cent. 
Sources. The following procedure has been adopted in making this adjustment: (o) Data for the 
years 1931-1936, both inclusive, have been taken from Banking and Monetary Statistics, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, 1943, pages 574-589, and after 1937 from 
the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, January 1949, 
page 130. (f>) The figures for the years before 1931 have been calculated by taking the net balances 
of the short-term capital movement according to the data for the United States balance of payments 
published in The United States in the World Economy, United States, Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Economic Series no. 23, appendix B. In charts 1 
and 2, the part of the curves before 1923 has not been adjusted owing to lack of data. 
The world total has been obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin for the years before 1940, 
and from the Annual Reports of the Bank for International Settlements, Basle, for later years. 
Data for 1948 are preliminary. All calculations have been made at a rate of $35 per fine ounce. 
When income falls in the principal centre during the cyclical down-
swing, the fall tends to spread to the rest of the world. If the latter's in-
come does not fall simultaneously and correspondingly, but with a cer-
tain lag a disequilibrium arises in the balance of payments. Since the 
fall in income is more rapid at the centre, the decrease in imports and 
other foreign payments is sharper there than in the rest of the world, 
with the result that the latter is forced to send gold to the centre. If 
equilibrium were possible—in the presence of cycles it is not—balance 
would be achieved when the respective incomes fell at the same rate. 
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CHART 1 
Gold reserves of the United States and the rest of the world 
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Note. The amounts representing net short-term dollar assets belonging to the 
countries of the rest of the world have been deducted from the gold holdings of the 
United States, since they represent monetary assets belonging to these countries and not 
to the United States. In view of the size of these assets at certain times, the effects of 
the adjustment are considerable. In 1947, for instance, the United States would have 
held 60 per cent of the world's gold, had not the exclusion of the above-mentioned 
dollar assets reduced the figure to 48.6 per cent. 
Sources: The following procedure has been adopted in making this adjustment: 
(a) Data for the years 1931-1936, both inclusive, have been taken from Banking and 
Monetary Statistics, Washington, 1943, pages 574-589, and after 1937 from the Inter-
national Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, January 
1949, page ISO. (6) The figures for the years before 1931 have been calculated by taking 
the net balances of the short-term capital movement according to the data for the 
United States balance of payments published in The United States in the World Econ-
omy, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com-
merce, Economic Series no. 23—Appendix B. In graphs 1 and 2 parts of the curve have 
not been adjusted, owing to lack of data. 
The world total has been obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin for the years 
before 1940, and from the Annual Reports of the Bank for International Settlements, 
Basle, for the later years. .. 
Data for 1948 are preliminary. All calculations have been made at a rate of ÇS5 per 
fine ounce. 
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TABLE 4 
Net short-term balances of other countries held in the United States 
In millions of dollars 
Short-term Short-term 
balances of balances of the 
other countries United States held 
held in the in other Net short-term 
United States countries balance 
Year (1) (2) (,) = (1)-(2) 
1923 £065 963 U02 
1924 2,450 1,147 1,303 
1925 2,349 1,225 1,124 
1926 3,119 1,286 1,833 
1927 4,700 1,877 2,823 
1928 4,502 2,268 2,234 
1929 4,834 2,606 2,227 
1930 4,346 2,930 1,417 
1931 2,205 1,867 338 
1932 1,261 1,586 -325 
1933 664 1,520 -856 
1934 610 1,132 -522 
1935 1,227 783 444 
1936 1,491 672 819 
1937 1,929 721 1,208 
1938 2,236 657 1,579 
1939 3,271 558 2,714 
1940 3,988 410 3,578 
1941 3,724 389 3,335 
1942.. 4,252 266 3,981 
1943 5,437 279 5,158 
1944 5,673 357 5,316 
1945 6,987 429 6,558 
1946 6,193 740 5,453 
1947 5,318 987 4,331 
1948.1 5,772 1,100 4,672 
Note. Balances for the years before 1931 in columns 1 and 2 were cal-
culated by adding to the 1931 figures the annual inflow into the United 
States of short-term capital owned by other countries and by subtracting 
the annual outflow to the rest of the world of short-term capital owned by 
the United States. 
Sources. The data for the years 1931 to 1936, inclusive, in columns 1 and 
2 have been taken from Banking and Monetary Statistics, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D. C; for the years 1937 
to 1948, from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, D. C. 
The cyclical contraction that occurred in the United States after 1929 
would have beçn sufficient to attract a great part of the gold it had lost 
during the previous expansion, as usually happened in the cycles of the 
old principal centre. In this case, however, there appeared a new factor 
which had not been an element of the British influence, namely, the de-
cline of the import coefficient. This decline was chiefly the result of two 
events: the raising of tariffs in 1929, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
a greater decline in the prices of imported primary products than in those 
of finished products (which have the most influence on national in-
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TABLE 5 
Import coefficient of the United States 
Relation of imports to income 
In millions of dollars 
National Percentage coefficient 
Year Imports income of imports 
1919 3,904 65,900 5.9 
1920 5,278 76,400 6.9 
1921 ; 2,509 60,300 4.1 
1922 3,112 61,500 5.0 
1923 3,792 72,900 5.2 
1924 3,609 73,300 4.4 
1925 4,226 77,800 5.4 
1926 4,430 82,800 5.3 
1927 4,184 81,300 5.1 
1928 4,091 83,300 4.9 
1929 4,399 87,300 5.0 
1930 3,060 75,000 4.0 
1931 2,090 58,800 3.5 
1932 1,322 41,600 3.2 
1933 1,449 39,500 3.7 
1934 1,655 48,600 3.4 
1935 2,047 56,700 3.6 
1936 . 2,422 66,900 3.6 
1937 3,083 73,600 4.2 
1938 . . . . . 1,960 67,300 2.9 
1939 2,318 72,500 3.2 
1940 2,625 81,300 3.2 
1941 3,345 103,800 3.2 
1942' 2,744 136,400 2.0 
1943 . . . . 3,381 168,200 2.0 
1944 3,919 182,200 2.2 
1945 4,147 182,800 2.3 
1946 "" . . . . 4,908 178,200 2.8 
1947 5,732 202,500 2.8 
1948-. ; . ' ; ; . ; ; 6,924 224,000 3.0 
Sources: Data on income have been taken from National Income and its Composition, 
by S. Kusnetz, New York, 1941, for the period 1919-1928; from the Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 1948, Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C, for the period 
1929-1947 and from Economic Indicators, February 1949 (U. S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D. C.) for the year 1948. Data on imports have been taken from 
the Statistical Abstract of the United States and from Economic Indicators. 
The decline of the import coefficient in the principal cyclical centre 
strengthens the tendency to accumulate gold, resulting from the con-
traction of income. In fact, imports in the centre fall even more sharply 
than in the rest of the world and the disequilibrium turns still further 
against the latter. To restore the balance, it would not only be necessary, 
as in the previous case, for the income of the rest of the world to con-
tract as sharply as that of the principal cyclical centre, but much more 
sharply. The greater the decline in the import coefficient and in other 
external payments of the principal cyclical centre, the more must the 
income of the rest of the world fall below the level of that centre. It 
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CHART 3 
Import coefficient of the United States 
Imports in relation to income 
6 -, 
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Source. The data for income have been obtained from National Income and its Com-
position, by S. Kusnetz, New York, 1941 for the years 1919-1928; from the Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 1948 for the years 1929-1947, and from Economic In-
dicators, February 1949, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C, for 
1948. The data on imports were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States and Economic Indicators. 
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must be remembered that, in addition to imports, these other external 
payments were also considerably reduced, by the cessation of the foreign 
loans made by the United States. 
After the trough of the depression had been reached, in 1933, another 
expansion took place. According to British cyclical experience, the prin-
cipal cyclical centre should have lost gold, as in fact it did during the 
expansion of the nineteen twenties. In the thirties, however, the opposite 
occurred; the monetary reserves of the United States attained extraor-
dinary proportions, even discounting, as has been done in all the charts, 
the large quantity of foreign funds which, for other reasons, were de-
posited in dollars in the United States. 
The decline of the import coefficient played a part in this. The in-
come of the centre would have had to increase much more than that 
of the rest of the world for the former to cease attracting gold after 
the contraction and subsequently to begin losing it. The increase would 
have had to be great enough, first to compensate the effects of the de-
cline in the coefficient, and then to surpass them. For instance, if the 
coefficient is halved, the income of the principal centre must increase 
to twice as much as that of the rest of the world, barely to offset the 
effects of such reduction. 
The income of the United States, far from achieving this relatively 
high increase, took longer than that of the rest of the world to reach 
the level it had attained in 1929, judging from what took place in an 
important group of countries (see table 6 and chart 4). 
It is thus not surprising that gold should have been steadily accumulat-
ing in the principal cyclical centre. The concentration of metal in the 
United States was, in fact, enormous. Practically all the new production 
of monetary gold in the world, which was certainly considerable after 
1933, collected in that country. The reserves of the rest of the world fell 
slightly, as may be seen in table 3.1 
i An examination has been made in the text of the factors which caused the United 
States to attract gold in the nineteen thirties. There were also factors operating in the 
rest of the world which caused the expulsion of gold. Outstanding among them were 
those which appeared during the two world wars. The United States acquired large 
quantities of gold in return for supplies furnished to the Allies. It could only have lost 
this gold through a much greater inflationary expansion of income than that which 
actually took place, a possibility which need not, therefore, be considered. This was not 
the only phenomenon in the redistribution of gold brought about by the two wars. 
Part of the gold received by the United States was transferred to neutral countries or 
non-belligerents, to cover their favourable balance of payments. This is a normal phe-
nomenon in the expansion of a cyclical centre, which was reflected in Latin America 
by a large increase in its metallic reserves. But it is also natural that a large part of 
the gold should return to the cyclical centre. This is what happened during the reces-
sion which took place in the United States after the First World War, and the cyclical 
movements of the British centre were also marked by fluctuations of gold. The present 
return of gold from the Latin-American countries to the United States, however, is 
different, in that the movement has begun before a contraction in that country has taken 
place. This is due, as already stated, to the rise in imports, occasioned by the high level 
of employment and accentuated by inflationary phenomena. 
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TABLE 6 
National income of the United States and of eleven other countries 
(Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom) 
In millions of dollars 
Indices 1929 = 100 
Income of Income of eleven United Eleven 
Year United States countries States countries 
1924 73,300 56,700 83Ü 77.9 
1925 77,800 57,200 89.1 78.6 
1926 82,800 59,200 94.8 81.4 
1927 81,300 63,700 93.1 87.6 
1928 83,300 68,700 95.4 94.4 
1929 87,300 72,700 100 100 
1930 75,000 62,000 85.9 85.2 
1931 58,800 56,200 67.3 77.3 
1932 .. 41,600 48,400 47.6 66.0 
1933 39,500 60,500 45.2 83.2 
1934 48,600 76,400 55.6 105.0 
1935 56,700 78,300 64.9 107.7 
1936 66,900 88,100 76.6 121.8 
1937 73,600 91,400 84.3 125.7 
1938 67,300 87,700 77.0 120.6 
Sources. Data taken from National Income and its Composition, by S. Kusnetz, New 
York, 1941, for the national income of the United States during the period 1924-1928 
inclusive (pages 310-11); Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948 for the period 
1929-1938; World Economic Development, Effects on Advanced Industrial Countries, 
by Eugene Staley, Montreal, 1945, for the income of the eleven countries (page 144, 
chart 13). 
If, in the nineteen thirties, the rest of the world had relied for its 
economic development solely upon the stimulus deriving from imports 
and other payments made by the United States, the increase of its in-
come would have been much less than that country's. As already pointed 
out, this is due to the depressive effect of the decline of the import 
coefficient of the United States. However, this did not actually happen 
since, in the countries shown in chart 4, income increased to a greater 
extent than in the United States. 
If these countries, like the rest of the world, had increased their in-
come without changing their import coefficient, it can be safely assumed 
that they would not have been able to do so for long without seriously 
impairing their monetary reserves. If this did not happen, it was simply 
because they had already reduced their coefficient of imports and other 
payments, especially of imports from the United States, which fell more 
than those from other sources, in order to attenuate the contraction 
originating in the United States.2 This enabled the rest of the world 
not only to develop in the way already described, but in several instances, 
to use part of its dollar exports to reduce its debt to the United States. 
2 See charts published for various countries in The United States in the World Econ-
omy, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com-
merce, Economic Series no. 23, pages 67, 68 and 69. 
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CHART 4 
National income of the United States and of eleven other countries 
(Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom) 





Source. Data for the national income of the United States have been obtained from 
National Income and its Composition, by S. Kusnetz, New York, 1941, pages 310-311, for 
the years 1924-1928, both inclusive; and from the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, 1948, for the years 1929-1938. Those for the income of the eleven countries were 
obtained from World Economic Development, Effects on Advanced Industrial Countries, 
by Eugene Staley, Montreal, 1945, page 144, chart 13. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA 29 
Why was the coefficient of imports from the United States reduced 
more sharply in the rest of the world than the latter's total coefficient? 
Obviously because the deficit in the balance of payments was more acute 
in terms of dollars. Had imports in other currencies been reduced to 
the same extent as those in dollars, the damage suffered by international 
trade in the nineteen thirties would have been even more severe, with 
consequent additional loss of its classical advantages. 
What were the reactions of Latin America when faced with the 
phenomena occurring in those years in the principal cyclical centres? 
It is needless to repeat the story of the well-known way in which such 
events were reflected in this part of the continent, but they should serve 
to clarify and define the best interests of Latin America. 
The reaction in Latin-America was similar to that of other countries 
in the rest of the world, namely, a reduction of the import coefficient 
through depreciation of the currency, higher tariffs, import quotas and 
exchange controls. 
Such measures had never been applied as widely ás in those days, since 
there had never been a shortage of pounds sterling under the monetary 
hegemony õf London. 
The rapid extension of exchange controls is explained by the pressing 
need to reduce imports immediately and to stem the flight of capital. 
However, exchange controls were a means not only of reducing the 
volume of imports, but also of diverting to other countries, mainly those 
of Europe, demand for imports which, because of their low cost and 
suitability to Latin America's needs, it had formerly been preferable 
to bring from the United States. Notwithstanding its implications, it 
would be difficult to deny the obvious fact that exchange control has, 
in many instances, been used as an instrument of discrimination in inter-
national trade, contrary to the sound practices established with great 
effort through the general application of the most-favoured-nation clause. 
It must, nevertheless, be recognized that, when a country lacked the 
dollars necessary to pay for its essential imports, the only way out of so 
critical a situation seemed to be to import goods payable in currencies 
received in payment of exports. 
Had these other currencies been convertible into dollars, the situation 
would have been very different. However, the dollar shortage affected 
all the rest of the world, and multilateral compensation could not be 
achieved when the total balance due in dollars exceeded available 
supplies. 
Exchange control was not the result of a theory but was imposed by 
circumstances. None who had first-hand knowledge of the complications, 
of every kind that it involved would have adopted such a measure, had 
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there been other alternatives available or had it been within the power 
of the Latin-American countries to eliminate the fundamental causes 
of the evil. 
Unfortunately these causes persisted too long. The abandonment of 
exchange control might have been considered when the worst of the 
world crisis was past and economic recovery in full swing, but the way 
in which the principal cyclical centre functioned made such a pos-
sibility remote. 
Table 7 and chart 5, showing the monetary reserves of Latin America, 
reveal the nature of the difficulties. Imports and other payments usually 
absorbed all the dollars newly added to the reserves and even a part 
of the reserves themselves. Exchange control, as already stated, served 
the purpose of diverting the demand for imports that could not be so 
financed. Even so, in the nineteen thirties it could not prevent total 
monetary reserves from remaining at a level considerably lower than 
that maintained in the nineteen twenties. 
Such was the significance of exchange control in those days. Whether 
handled well or badly, it was the means of mitigating the serious reper-
cussions of events abroad on the internal activity of the Latin-American 
countries. Later, however, its functions changed considerably. Exchange 
control has been, and still is, used to check the effects of internal infla-
tionary expansion on imports and other liability items in the balance 
of payments. It is evident that in this instance exchange control, instead 
of counteracting the effects of inflation, diverts the inflationary pressure 
toward internal activity, thus accentuating the rise in prices. 
The same considerations thus do not apply in both cases. Latin-
American countries had no influence over the external factors that im-
posed exchange control in the nineteen thirties. On the other hand, the 
factors operating today are dependent upon their own decisions, as 
Latin-American governments, concerned as they are at the gravity of 
this problem, have more than once admitted. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine to what extent the scarcity 
of dollars, which once more faces several Latin-American countries, is 
the result of the low import coefficient of the United States and to what 
extent it is the result of the inflationary pressure referred to above. 
It has already been explained that the high level of employment at-
tained in Latin America entails a considerable volume of dollar imports. 
Meanwhile,: as its national income had reached an extremely high level, 
the United States also increased its imports from Latin America and 
other countries-of the world. In 1948, its total imports amounted to 6,900 
million dollars, with a coefficient of only 3 per cent. Had the coefficient 
been 5 per cent, as in 1929, imports would have totalled 11,500 million. 
These figures show the magnitude of the effects produced by the decline 
of the import coefficient. 
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It is still too early to say whether or not the Latin-American countries' 
share of these imports will provide them with sufficient means of cover-
ing their import needs in addition to the other payments they hâve to 
make to the United States. A considered opinion cannot yet be given. 
Information is still very inadequate and does not permit an examination 
of the composition of imports for the purpose of determining with suffi-
cient accuracy how much of the increase has been due to the redistribu-
tion of income typical of inflation. There are instances of considerable 
dollar payments for imports wholly unrelated to industrialization or the 
mechanization of agriculture, but it is difficult to say to what extent 
such cases can be considered general. 
TABLE 7 
Gold reserves of Latin-America 
In millions of dollars at 35 dollars an ounce 
Seven countries Twelve countries 
(Argentina, Bolivia, (Colombia, Ecuador, El 
Brazil, Chile, Peru, Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, 

















1929 1,180 1,257 
1930 892 940 
1931 656 689 
1932 579 619 
1933 585 614 
1934 583 640 
1935 647 721 
1936 714 794 
1937 656 712 
1938 638 705 
1939 693 760 
Note. Since figures for the first years of this period, starting with 1913, are available 
for only seven countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and Vene-
zuela), the curve on chart 5 has been drawn up to 1939, and on this curve, starting with 
1929, has been superimposed another including five more countries (Colombia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico). These figures represent gold reserves 
only. All data are expressed at the rate of 35 dollars per ounce. 
Source. Banking and Monetary Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Washington, D. C, 1943. 
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In any case, very special attention should be paid to the events now 
taking place. For instance, the recommendations recently made by the 
Joint Brazil-United States Technical Commission in its interesting report 
on Brazil are decidedly symptomatic. 
There is great similarity between the measures envisaged by the Com-
mission in connexion with imports and those which, as recalled above, 
several Latin-American countries were compelled to take in the nineteen 
thirties. 
CHART 5 







1915 20 25 30 35 40 
Includes seven countries. 
—^— Includes twelve countries. 
Note. As data for the earlier years of this period, 1913-1939, were available for only 
seven countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) the 
appropriate curve including them is shown until 1939. Five additional countries 
(Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico) are included in the second 
curve covering the years 1929-1939. These figures refer only to gold reserves and were 
calculated at the rate of $35 per fine ounce. 
Sources. Monetary and Banking Statistics, Washington, 1943, for the years 1913-1936; 
and International Financial Statistics, Washington, 1949, for the years 1937-1939. 
Despite the great increase in Brazil's dollar exports, the Commission 
has shown that they are not sufficient to cover its imports in that cur-
rency. It therefore approves the restriction of non-essential imports 
through a more effective application of the system of exchange control 
and recognized that "it would be necessary for Brazil to obtain its essen-
tial imports, as far as possible, from soft-currency countries with which 
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that "one measure which might assist in reducing the total of hard cur-
rency imports, would be to require a review by the control authorities 
of all purchases in the dollar area proposed to be made by Brazilian 
government departments and 'autarquias' ".s 
It is remarkable that a report of this nature should envisage not only 
the restriction of imports through exchange control, but also the appli-
cation of discriminatory measures. 
The case would be of no great significance if it were merely a recogni-
tion of the temporary need for relieving pressure on the balance of pay-
ments. If, however, it is the expression of something more fundamental 
and persistent, the Latin-American countries would have serious cause 
for concern. 
Experience has shown that multilateral trade is the best suited to the 
economic development of Latin America. The ideal would be to be able 
to buy and sell in the best, though perhaps different, markets, without 
dividing foreign trade into water-tight compartments. The situation in 
which sales to Europe must be strictly counterbalanced by purchases 
from that continent, or even from each European country, with no pos-
sibility of using the balances for purchasing from the United States the 
goods which best satisfy the needs of Latin-American economic develop-
ment, is not a solution that offers the undeniable advantages of multi-
lateral trade. 
It is essential, if multilateral compensation is to be practicable, that 
Europe have a dollar surplus with which to pay for its excess purchases 
from Latin America, after having satisfied its own import requirements 
from the United States. 
This is, without doubt, the difficulty encountered by the Joint Brazil-
United States Technical Commission. In the face of it, the Commission 
had only two alternative courses of action: either to propose the measures 
it actually recommended to Brazil or to suggest application of restric-
tions to all the countries equally, to the detriment not only of the ex-
ports of those countries with which Brazil has a favourable balance, but 
also to the rate of its economic growth. 
The events of the nineteen thirties seem to have left the conviction 
that no fundamental solution can be expected from trade with the United 
States. Indeed, if the present extremely low import coefficient is main-
tained, its imports might be insufficient to solve the latent problem of 
a dollar shortage, even on the favourable assumption that maximum 
employment in that country would last. If, with maximum employment, 
income were to rise in the future at a rate unlikely to prove much more 
than 3 per cent a year, a corresponding increase in imports from the 
rest of the world would not do much to relieve the dollar pressure. 
» Report of the Joint Brazil-United States Technical Commission, Rio de Janeiro, 
1949, pages 32-33. 
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Is there, however, no possibility of an increase in the import coefficient 
of that country, whereby its imports would increase more rapidly than 
national income? 
The possibility does exist. The persistent attraction of gold toward 
a principal cyclical centre is only conceivable theoretically when there 
is a considerable margin of unemployed factors of production. 
There could be no repetition of the phenomena of the nineteen thirties 
if the United States were able to maintain maximum employment and if 
the rest of the world, thus stimulated by.the principal centre, were able 
to carry out a similar policy of full utilization of its growing productive 
factors. 
As explained in connexion with the adverse experience of those years, 
since there was unemployment in the United States, the rest of the world 
could not maintain its import coefficient with respect to that country 
without adjusting it to that of the United States with respect to the rest 
of the world, as no country can carry a permanent deficit in its balance 
of payments. Maximum employment, however, can alter the situation 
very much, as a brief reasoning will show. 
Let us assume that a relatively high coefficient of the rest of the world, 
or better still a coefficient increased by the industrialization of Latin 
America, causes a sharp rise in the demand for exports from the United 
States. Let us further assume that, through the growth of productive 
factors, income increases annually by, say, 6,000, of which 4,000 repre-
sents factors employed in the export industry to satisfy the great demand 
and the remaining 2,000, industries supplying domestic needs, with an 
equivalent volume of production. 
It is obvious that this volume of 2,000 will be insufficient to satisfy 
the internal demand created by the expenditure of the 6,000 income. 
Demand will then exceed supply, and since internal factors are fully 
employed, the deficit of production for internal requirements will have 
to be covered by imports. 
If the productive factors were not fully employed, the excess of demand 
over supply would tend rather to stimulate internal production, and 
imports, far from rising in proportion to excess demand, would show 
only a slight increase, representing that part of the excess which is barely 
reflected in a demand for foreign goods, owing to the low import coeffi-
cient. 
The nature of this report precludes more detailed development of the 
argument. It should be pointed out, however, that for such machinery 
to function, it is essential that the rest of the world be able to satisfy 
the United States' increased demand for imports, since the process would 
otherwise be inflationary. At the same time, the countries increasing 
their coefficient or their real income should be assured of sufficient re-
sources to face a temporary disequilibrium in their balance of payments, 
pending the reaction of the principal cyclical centre. 
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In short, with full employment at the cyclical centre, any increase in 
its exports to the rest of the world, brought about by the action of the 
latter, would tend to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in 
imports (or other payments abroad) and gold would not tend to con-
centrate at the centre, to the detriment of the other countries. 
It is clear that if this is to be achieved, the centre must not lower its 
import coefficient. In any case, what purpose would be served by such 
a measure if all productive factors are already fully employed? It is 
understandable that internal production should be substituted for im-
ports in order to increase employment when there are unemployed 
factors. It is also understandable that, even when there is full employ-
ment, a country should avoid the sacrifice, through foreign competition, 
of industries supplying domestic consumption to favour those produc-
ing for export, as happened in the case of the British cyclical centre 
during the nineteenth century. Where full employment exists, however, 
it would show a lack of economic sense to lower the import coefficient 
generally while at the same time encouraging the development of cer-
tain industries producing for domestic consumption, at the expense of 
international trade. 
Consequently, if nothing should hamper the natural play of economic 
forces, where there is full and growing employment at the principal 
cyclical centre, the way should be clear for the solution of that funda-
mental problem which is of such concern to the countries of Latin-
America and the rest of the world. The import coefficient of the United 
States would certainly increase, even if existing tariffs were left unaltered, 
and its interdependence with the rest of the world would be strength-
ened. Thus it could be demonstrated that, in addition to full employ-
ment, the United States could achieve two other fundamental objectives 
of its economic policy: the active promotion of foreign trade and the 
furthering of Latin-American industrialization. 
Another theoretical consideration closely related to the foregoing ques-
tions should be noted before closing this section. As yet nothing positive 
has been achieved in the attempt to explain, with the help of the classi-
cal theory, the fluctuations of the balances of payments and the inter-
national movements of gold in the nineteen thirties. Such an attempt 
could hardly have been successful, since, as is well known, the classical 
theory is based on the assumption of full employment. If this assumption 
were to take place in reality, the essential soundness of the classical reason-
ing regarding gold movements could be proved, allowing, of course, for 
the partial modifications which the theory demands. As Lord Keynes 
pointed out in his General Theory, with full employment we are safely 
ensconced in a Ricardian world. The opinion expressed on this, in his 
posthumous article published in the Economic Journal, is, therefore, not 
surprising: "I find myself moved, not for the first time, to remind con-
temporary economists that the classical teaching embodied some per-
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manent truths of great significance, which we are liable today to over-
look because we associate them with other doctrines which we cannot 
now accept without much qualification. There are in these matters deep 
undercurrents at work, natural forces, one can call them, or even the in-
visible hand, which are operating towards equilibrium . . . Admittedly, 
if the classical medicine is to work, it is essential that import tariffs and 
export subsidies should not progressively offset its influence. It is for 
this reason that one is entitled to draw some provisional comfort from 
the present mood of the American Administration and, as I judge it, 
of the American people also, as embodied in the Proposals for Considera-
tion by an International Conference on Trade and Employment. We 
have here sincere and thoroughgoing proposals, advanced on behalf of 
the United States, expressly directed towards creating a system which 
allows the classical medicine to do its work".4 
* Lord Keynes, "The Balance of Payments of the United States", The Economic Jour-
nal, June 1946, pages 185 and 186. 
V. Capital formation in Latin America and the inflationary 
process 
The margin of savings depends ultimately upon the progressive in-
crease of labour productivity. Though the level of productivity achieved 
by some Latin-American countries is such that, by means of a judicious 
policy, they would be able to reduce the amount of foreign capital 
needed to supplement national savings to moderate proportions, in the 
majority of them this capital is admittedly indispensable. 
In actual fact, productivity in these countries is very low owing to 
lack of capital; and the lack of capital is due to the narrow margin of 
savings resulting from this low productivity. The temporary help of 
foreign capital is necessary if this vicious circle is to be broken without 
unduly restricting the present consumption of the masses, which, gen-
erally speaking, is very low. If this capital is effectively used, the increase 
in productivity will, in time, allow savings to accumulate which could be 
substituted for foreign capital in the new investments necessitated by new 
technical processes and the growth of the population. 
Throughout most of Latin America, the characteristic lack of savings 
is the result, not only of this narrow margin, but, in many cases, of its 
improper use. Saving means refraining from consumption and is thus 
incompatible with certain types of consumption peculiar to relatively high 
income groups. 
Great disparities in the distribution of income may be, as they have 
been in the past, a factor favourable to the accumulation of capital and 
technical progress. Although the influences of that factor in the Latin-
American countries should not be overlooked, there are many well-known 
examples of how such distributive inequalities have fostered types of 
consumption peculiar to countries of high productivity. Considerable 
opportunities for saving and effectively employing monetary reserves for 
productive imports are thus frequently lost. 
It is the increase in productivity that has enabled the United States, 
and to a lesser degree other industrial countries, to shorten the working 
day, raise the real income and standard of living of the masses, and con-
siderably increase public expenditure, without impeding a huge accumu-
lation of capital. 
It is a well-known fact that fiscal expenditure, which, in the middle of 
the last century, formed a relatively small part of national income in the 
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great industrial countries, today represents a large portion of it. This has 
become possible only as a result of increased productivity. 
The Latin-American countries have also followed this general tendency. 
If, where productivity is high and the accumulation of capital consid-
erable, the increase in the proportions of public expenditure is cause for 
concern, it must be even more so in countries where a considerable part 
of the national income must be devoted to saving, since saving is neces-
sary to attain that increase in productivity without which the aim of 
raising the standard of living of the masses would be a mere illusion. 
The problem is essentially one of estimating needs. The resources avail-
able to satisfy the enormous individual and collective needs of the Latin-
American countries are relatively small, and the possible contribution of 
foreign capital is also limited. Those needs must therefore be evaluated 
from the standpoint of the aim in view, in order that the limited resources 
may be most advantageously distributed. If the aim is to increase the 
measurable well-being of the community, the increase of capital per man 
must take very high priority. There are various types of public and private 
investment which are indisputably useful for this purpose, but since they 
do not increase productivity, they cannot bring about the increase in sav-
ing necessary for new investments. On the other hand, those same invest-
ments, if put into efficient capital goods, will immediately increase 
productivity and so develop a margin of saving which, transformed into 
new investments, will give rise to yet further increases in productivity. 
For these and many other reasons, the problem of capital formation is 
of the utmost importance. 
The considerable pressure of those individual and collective needs on 
comparatively scanty resources usually provokes inflationary processes 
such as those with which the governments are now so rightly preoccupied. 
At the same time there has grown up a belief, not only among the privi-
leged, but also among those whose only concern is the general welfare, 
that inflation is an unavoidable means of forced capitalization where 
voluntary saving is evidently insufficient. 
It is a thesis worthy of careful examination. Since the process is wide-
spread, there is a wealth of data available for fruitful investigation which 
will later permit an appreciation of its value and range. Meanwhile, some 
comments may contribute to define this problem. 
One indisputable fact stands out: the stimulus of monetary expansion 
has led to a high level of employment and thereby to a real increase in 
income. It appears, however, that a large part of that effect had already 
been achieved during a phase of moderate credit expansion which pre-
ceded the acute inflationary process. As that process developed, the 
increase in employment and real income became less and less marked, 
and that of prices more so, with consequent disturbances in the distribu-
tion of total income. 
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This experience provides both positive and negative lessons.1 The posi-
tive lesson is pertinent to the subject since the growth of employment 
brought about an increase in the potential margin of savings. The nega-
tive lesson is also concerned with it. The exaggeration of the stimulus 
necessary for the achievement of maximum employment led internally to 
excessive inflationary pressure, which, with the rise in imports consequent 
upon the resumption of foreign trade after war-time restrictions, absorbed 
a large part of the gold and dollars which had been accumulated. 
The fragmentary information available raises more than one doubt as 
to whether those reserves have been used in strict accordance with the 
needs of the economic development of Latin America. In order to throw 
light upon those doubts, it would be interesting to discover to what extent 
the aforesaid reserves have been used to import the most essential capital 
equipment, how far they have been spent on non-essential articles or 
those related only to the mode of living of high-income groups, and to 
what extent they have served to cover the capital outflow caused by the 
process of inflation.2 
These different uses of foreign exchange are closely linked with the 
internal effects of inflation. The rise in prices, by creating exceptional 
profits, places in the hands of a comparatively small group great oppor-
tunities for saving, as always happens when income distribution is altered 
in such a way. It would be extremely interesting to ascertain to what 
extent these opportunities have been translated into collective savings 
and whether those savings have been put to the most productive use from 
the standpoint of the community. 
If a large part of the profits arising out of inflation had actually been 
saved and efficiently invested, those who expound the foregoing thesis 
would have a strong point in their favour. Unfortunately isolated figures 
do not provide sufficient reliable evidence to justify any generalization. 
None the less, the information on Brazil presented by the Joint Brazil-
United States Technical Commission is illuminating. In 1946 the large 
corporations reinvested 30 to 40 per cent of their profits and distributed 
the rest among the shareholders. The amount distributed by all the cor-
porations is believed to have amounted to 12,000 million cruzeiros, of 
which one fourth, or barely 3,000 million, represented various forms oí 
1 The possibility of a rational policy of employment of idle or ill-employed resources 
has been shown by experience. At one time exports had constituted the chief dynamic 
factor. After the world crisis, however, they proved insufficient to fulfil adequately their 
role of stimulating development. In the nineteen thirties, the weakness of the external 
dynamic factor had already been counteracted in some of the Latin-American countries 
by a policy of internal stimulation. In order to do so, as was explained elsewhere, it was 
necessary to reduce the import coefficient. The events of the Second World War showed 
how much further this policy could be carried. The war brought about a drastic reduc-
tion of the coefficient, while at the same time increasing the force of the external 
stimulus. 
2 It is interesting to note that Latin-American private deposits in the United States 
amounted to $729 million on 30 June 1947. 
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saving.8 Taking the figures as a whole, only about 50 per cent of total 
profits would represent direct or indirect investments. 
That being so, the proportion consumed would have been considerable. 
Since, moreover, the high-income groups have a high import coefficient, 
it is not surprising that a large part of the foreign exchange accumulated 
should have been spent on products not essential to economic develop-
ment, as may be inferred from other information from the same source. 
There is yet another aspect of the question to be clarified. Assuming 
that under given circumstances a certain amount of inflationary expan-
sion is considered the most practical expedient, in view of the scarcity of 
savings, there would be ways of best achieving that purpose, at the same 
time mitigating the serious consequences of the inflation. The State has 
means of stimulating the investment of a large portion of profits and infla-
tionary incomes through progressive taxation of the part spent and con-
sumed, while lowering the tax or granting exemption on the part invested; 
furthermore, through exchange control or taxation, it can divert the part 
which tends to be used for imports incompatible with strong economic 
growth. Such means may, of course, also serve to increase unproductive 
public expenditure instead of savings, to the detriment of an increase 
in national productivity. 
Logically, if some groups have benefited considerably from inflation, 
others must have suffered. Conclusive studies have not yet been made, but 
it would seem that there is no essential difference between inflation today 
and in the past. The middle class and the fixed-income groups have gen-
erally been those to bear the brunt of the transference of real income to 
entrepreneurs and other beneficiaries. The better organized labour unions 
have through wage increases managed to overtake, and at times surpass, 
the price rise, although usually with a lag. There are not enough reliable 
data, however, to ascertain to what extent the whole group has benefited 
and not merely certain sectors. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten 
that the increase in employment during the first stage of the expansion-
ary process has usually meant an increase in the real income of the 
working class family, even when wages have not been adjusted to rising 
prices. 
All this redistribution of income brought about by inflation creates 
in the sectors that benefit the illusion that the total wealth of the com-
munity is increasing, even though real income ceased to rise to any 
extent, once the initial stage of moderate expansion was passed. It is 
an illusion peculiar to the stage of euphoria and prodigality; during 
that time capital equipment is not renewed, as in the case of transport 
and other public and private investments, and a large part of the pre-
vious increase in monetary reserves is spent in a short while. This means 
the consumption of accumulated capital and so must not be mistaken 
8 Report of the Joint Brazil-United States Technical Commission, part III. 
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for a real increase in income. The illusion begins to fade during the 
second phase—that of increasing tension—and finally disappears during 
the third—that of painful readjustment. 
The first stage seems to be over in Latin America, and as the second 
develops, acute social antagonisms are appearing, which threaten the effi-
cacy of the existing economic system. An atmosphere unfavourable to the 
smooth development of that system is being created, and with it certain 
kinds of governmental intervention and fiscal measures prejudicial to 
private initiative and undermining the sense of individual responsibility. 
Thus the inflation that has greatly increased the remuneration of the 
entrepreneur ends by impairing his efficiency—a factor of vital impor-
tance for the growth of the Latin-American countries. 
The State soon takes a substantial share of the entrepreneur's infla-
tionary gains in the form of taxes. The increase in public expenditure 
resulting from that participation will present a problem no less serious 
than the others, when inflationary profits disappear and it becomes neces-
sary to bring State wages and salaries into line with the cost of living, with 
the obvious risk that the proportion of national income represented by 
public expenditure will again rise, to the detriment of capital formation. 
Sound conclusions regarding the value of inflation as an instrument 
for collective saving can be drawn only after an objective analysis of the 
above facts and of others arising out of it. Whatever the final figures, it 
will have to be admitted that inflation has tended to discourage typical 
forms of voluntary saving which had acquired growing importance in 
some Latin-American countries. Here may be found the source of future 
savings for industrialization, when monetary stability can be restored in 
accordance with the new rules of the game imposed by new conditions. 
In short, if the forced savings which accumulate through inflation are 
furnished by many sections of the community whereas the benefits thereof 
are passed on to favoured groups only, the question arises whether it is 
not possible to devise other forms of saving (either voluntary or collec-
tive) by which resources could be better devoted to productive ends, with-
out the serious social disadvantages of forced saving. 
Meanwhile an appeal to foreign savings appears inevitable. Unfortu-
nately, in this connexion the problem inherited from the disastrous 
experience of the nineteen thirties is still far from solution. While the 
default of the debtor is still fresh in the memory of the creditor countries, 
there is a tendency both to forget the circumstances in which default 
occurred and to spread the mistaken belief that a recurrence of past events 
could be avoided by the observance of certain rules of procedure. At the 
root of this we find the same fundamental problem as was mentioned in 
connexion with foreign trade trends. This was pointed out by the United 
States Department of Commerce in a study published some years ago.4 
* The United States in the World Economy, Economic Series no. 23, Washington, 
D. C, 1943, page 6. 
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In 1929 the United States supplied the rest of the world with $7,400 mil-
lion in payment of imports, investments and other items; hence the rest 
of the world could easily pay the $900 million due in fixed financial services 
on capital invested by the United States, apart from remittances of profits. 
In 1932, however, the supply of dollars was reduced to $2,400 million, 
while the services, had they been paid, would still have amounted to 
$900 million. The rest of the world would thus have had barely $1,500 
million to cover its imports and other payments to the United States, as 
against $6,500 million in 1929. 
In the light of these figures, it is not surprising that default was more 
or less general throughout Latin America. The few countries that con-
tinued to meet their obligations did so at great sacrifice, at the cost of a 
severe contraction of their internal economy and to the detriment of their 
monetary reserves. It is only natural that, after such an experience, they 
should be reluctant to find themselves once more in a position in which 
they must either fail to meet their obligations or sacrifice their economy. 
Until a solution to the fundamental problem of foreign trade is found, 
care must be taken that dollar investments, where they cannot be used to 
further dollar exports, shall contribute, directly or indirectly, to the 
reduction of imports in that currency, in order to facilitate future pay-
ment of services. 
From this and other points of view, it would seem imprudent to renew 
the active flow of investments of the nineteen twenties without adopting 
a plan to deal with the series of concrete problems which arise in this 
connexion. The existence of international credit institutions could be a 
very effective factor in the drafting of such a plan, in which the types of 
investment best suited to the development of Latin-American economy 
through their contribution to productivity and to the development of the 
necessary capacity for repayment may be considered in co-operation with 
the individual countries concerned. 
There seems no reason why this plan should not include the field of 
private investment. Much is heard about the need for establishing a sys-
tem of guarantees or regulations in order to promote it. All this is worthy 
of further consideration. New measures must, however, be developed in 
the light of past experience. There were many other difficulties besides the 
fundamental ones of the nineteen thirties, and the abuses on both sides 
should be fully admitted in order to prevent a repetition of the evil. 
In this way, and with effective technical assistance, it should be possible 
to develop an investment policy that would be welcomed by all concerned 
because of its reciprocal advantages. 
VI. The limits of industrialization 
It is obvious that the economic growth of Latin America depends on 
the increase of the average income per inhabitant (which in most 
countries is extremely low) and on an increase in population. 
An increase in the average income per inhabitant could be achieved in 
only two ways: first, through an increase in productivity; and second, 
assuming a certain level of productivity, through an increase in income 
per man engaged in primary production, in relation to the income of the 
industrial countries which import part of that production. This readjust-
ment, as already explained, tends to correct the disparity in income 
brought about by the way in which the benefits of technical progress are 
distributed between the centres and the periphery. 
We shall now consider the increase in productivity in relation to the 
existing population. There are two aspects of the question. On the one 
hand, the adoption of modern technique will allow production per man 
to increase, making labour available to increase production in the same 
activities in which it was already employed, or directing it to others. 
On the other, the index of productivity will also be raised by the diver-
sion of persons ill-employed in activities where the very low productivity 
cannot be increased to any notable extent, to others where technical 
progress makes such improvement possible. 
Agriculture offers a typical example of the influence of technical prog-
ress. In some of its important branches, technical development has made 
possible a steady increase in production with a proportionally lower 
increase in employment. In other words, agriculture absorbs a decreasing 
proportion of the increase in the population of working age, with the 
result that industry and other activities have been able to increase their 
employment more. This is not a case of diverting, to other work, people 
already employed, but of offering a different form of employment to 
people reaching working age. There have, however, been instances in 
which the rapid growth of industry during recent years has brought about 
an actual transference of workers, with unfavourable consequences for 
agriculture. 
Furthermore, the increase in foreign demand for agricultural products 
after the great depression was, in general, relatively slow, by comparison 
with the rate in previous years. Taking this fact in conjunction with the 
consequences mentioned above, it would be difficult to say what produc-
tive activities, other than industry, could have absorbed the increase in 
population o[ the Latin-American countries which export such products. 
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It is quite possible that technical progress in other activities will bring 
consequences similar to those just pointed out. That, too, will mean an 
important source of man-power for industrial development. 
This is not the only possible source. The low level of productivity in 
industry itself represents a wastage of man-power which, given the proper 
use of modern technique, can be employed to great general advantage in 
expanding existing industries or in developing new ones. 
Finally, there is another possibility which the recent experience of some 
countries has shown to be worthy of consideration. The low income level 
prevailing among the masses has made it possible for the higher income-
groups to enjoy hand-made goods and certain types of personal services 
at comparatively low prices. This is due to what we have termed ill-
employed man-power. As productivity in industry increases and real 
income, per capita, rises, there is a natural tendency for the ill-employed 
to move towards industry. However disturbing this trend may be to some 
sectors of society, it is the usual way in which the benefits of technical 
progress are passed on to all social groups within a country, as the expe-
rience of the great industrial countries has shown. The solution does not 
lie wholly in an increase in productivity, however. The social aim of 
industrialization might well be jeopardized if too large a part of the 
increase were to be devoted to increasing consumption or to a premature 
slackening of productive effort. 
It has been emphasized that, to achieve this increase in productivity, 
capital, per capita, must be considerably increased and the technique for 
its effective use acquired. The need is progressive. In fact, a general 
increase in wages resulting from greater productivity in industry gradu-
ally spreads to other activities, which are thereby obliged to use more 
capital, per capita, in order to achieve the increase in productivity with-
out which they would be unable to pay higher wages. Thus many activi-
ties in which human labour is now more profitable, because it is cheaper, 
will tend to become mechanized; the same will happen to a certain 
degree in household economy. 
It is not possible to estimate, even approximately, the extent of these 
potential capital requirements and thus of the resources that will be 
needed to satisfy them, since even present capital, per capita, employed 
in the principal Latin-American countries cannot be determined with any 
satisfactory degree of accuracy. However, to judge from the needs which 
have already arisen during the initial stage of the industrialization process, 
the resources made available by exports—at least by dollar exports—do 
not appear adequate to meet those requirements after other imports and 
foreign payments have been met. 
As already explained, the possibility must be faced that a reduction in 
the import coefficient may be necessary. This may apply to either the 
general coefficient or the dollar coefficient and may be brought about by 
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decreasing or eliminating non-essential goods, in order to allow increased 
imports of capital goods. A change in the composition of imports would 
in any case appear essential to the development of industrialization. 
It should be clearly understood what this means. It is merely the adapta-
tion of imports to the resources made available by exports. If the latter 
were to rise sufficiently, it would not be necessary to restrict imports, 
except as a further means of intensifying industrialization. Exports from 
Latin America, however, are largely dependent on fluctuations in income 
in the United States and Europe and on their respective import coeffi-
cients for Latin-American products. Consequently they cannot be con-
trolled directly by Latin America, and the situation can be changed only 
by the decision of the other countries. 
It would be a different matter if Latin America intended to carry indus-
trialization to the point of directing certain factors away from primary 
production to industry in order to increase the output of the latter to 
the detriment of the former: in other words, if Latin America, being in 
a position to maintain exports and imports at a specified level, were 
deliberately to lower it, sacrificing part of its exports in order to increase 
industrial production as a substitute for imports. 
Would there in that case be an increase in productivity? At this point 
the question would be defined in classical terms. It would be a matter of 
discovering whether the increase in industrial production brought about 
by the factors diverted from primary production was or was not greater 
than the amount of goods formerly obtained in exchange for the exports. 
Only if it were greater, could it be said that there was an increase in 
productivity, from the standpoint of the community; if it were not, there 
would be a loss of real income. 
This then is one of the most important limits of industrialization, one 
of a dynamic nature which might become less restrictive as the economy 
developed but which should be constantly borne in mind, however, if the 
primary objective is to increase the real welfare of the masses. 
There is no sign that Latin America is approaching this limit. It is in 
the initial stage of the industrialization process and in most cases the 
man-power available as a result of increased productivity is still amply 
sufficient for industrial growth. Moreover, it does not seem that the 
countries in which this process of industrialization has reached a more 
advanced stage have yet been driven to choose between an actual increase 
in exports and industrial development. 
Nevertheless, exports can be sacrificed to an illusory increase in real 
income long before the possibilities of intensifying productivity or of 
utilizing all the man-power available have been exhausted. 
An increase in productivity requires a considerable increase in capital, 
and before this can be achieved, a long time will elapse and new tech-
niques will appear which may call for further increases in capital, in 
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addition to that necessitated by the growth of population. At the same 
time, savings are scarce. It is necessary, therefore, to use them in such a 
way as to obtain the maximum increase in output. However, a mistaken 
policy could cause deficient use of these savings, as can be easily demon-
strated. 
It has been said that technical progress in agriculture and the compara-
tively slow foreign demand for its products have, in many cases, allowed 
industry to absorb a larger part of the increase in population of working 
age than agriculture. Let us assume that year after year this increase in 
hands is required in agriculture in order to meet rising foreign demands 
in addition to the increase in domestic consumption, but that, as a result 
of various measures, industrial development is expanded to such an 
extent that agriculture is deprived of the hands it needs in order to con-
tinue increasing exports. 
The reasons why the substitution of industrial production for exports 
may represent a loss of real income have already been explained. There 
would, however, be also another loss. Land is a very valuable factor of 
production, which costs nothing. By comparison with industry, the 
amount of capital that must be added to it is relatively small. Conse-
quently, the men who could have worked efficiently in agriculture occa-
sion a demand for more capital when employed in industry. That 
increased capital could, however, have been put to more productive use 
if, instead of being diluted in the total annual increase in population, 
it had been confined to a part of that increase: the higher capital per man 
would have resulted in greater productivity. Hence, the dilution of capital 
would not have allowed the increase in productivity that otherwise might 
have been obtained. Thus to the direct loss would be added another, 
which, although less tangible, would be nonetheless real. 
Furthermore, if productivity did not increase, there would be less 
incentive for ill-employed persons to go into industry, with the result 
that, instead of man-power being used to the best advantage, it would be 
disadvantageous^ diverted away from highly productive occupations. 
This is not a remote possibility, but a danger to which Latin America 
is continually exposed and into which it may sometimes have fallen for 
lack of economic development programmes with specific aims and clearly 
defined means to achieve them. Capital is scarce and it would indeed be 
deplorable to invest it where it would lessen total productivity rather 
than where it could increase it. 
It should therefore not be forgotten that the greater the exports from 
Latin America the greater may be the rate of its economic development. 
We should not, however, lose sight of the possibility that a recrudescence 
of protectionist policy in countries that import from Latin America might 
lead to the replacement of those imports with goods produced locally. 
Such a turn of events would be highly regrettable, but should it occur, 
the only solution would appear to lie in limiting the growth of imports 
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or even reducing them in absolute terms, in order to adjust them to 
exports. In such a contingency, the increase in real per capita income 
would be less than it might have been, and it is conceivable that it might 
decline if the phenomenon became acute. 
In this connexion it is necessary to take into consideration one ele-
mentary fact. Europe has lost a large part of its investments in other parts 
of the world and, from the point of view of the availability of dollars, 
cannot be expected, even when the process of reconstruction is complete, 
to be in a position to supply dollars to Latin America. On the contrary, 
it will need to take great care to balance its own trade. Consequently, even 
if one individual country were able for a time to reduce its imports to 
Europe without perceptible loss in its exports to that area, it is obvious 
that Latin America as a whole could not do so. 
In discussing the increase in capital, per capita, we have implicitly 
assumed that industrial establishments would be able to attain a satis-
factory size, for which a minimum of production is required. What is this 
size in the Latin-American countries? The variety of conditions obtain-
ing in the different countries makes it difficult to generalize in this case, 
as in others. Moreover, no systematic study of productivity and its relation 
to the optimum size of the establishment and the industry has yet been 
made in these countries. Depressive examples are quoted, however, of the 
sub-division of industry into an excessive number of inefficient undertak-
ings within one country or of the multiplication of comparatively small 
enterprises in countries which, by combining their markets for a number 
of products, could reach a higher degree of productivity. The present 
division of markets, with its consequent inefficiency, constitutes another 
limitation of industrial growth, in this case one which could be overcome 
by the combined efforts of countries which, by reason of their geographi-
cal position and economic features, would be able to undertake it to 
their general advantage. 
It was pointed out at the beginning of this section that there are two 
ways of increasing real income. One is through an increase in produc-
tivity and the other through a readjustment of income from primary pro-
duction so as to lessen the disparity between it and income of the great 
industrial countries. 
The second result can be achieved only in so far as the first is accom-
plished. As productivity and the average real income from industry 
increase in the Latin-American countries, wages in agriculture and pri-
mary production in general will have to rise, as they have in other 
countries. 
The effect will be gradual and if there is not some relationship between 
all the respective increases in average income of the principal countries 
exporting primary products, unavoidable difficulties may arise in read-
justments of the kind just mentioned, whether they be internal or inter-
national. 
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The possibility of gaining ground in this sphere depends also on the 
ability of Latin America to maintain the prices of primary products in 
the cyclical downswing, the point at which it has frequently lost all or a 
part of the share of the benefits of technical progress that the periphery 
usually receives in the upswing. There is room here for international 
economic co-operation. 
VIL Bases for the discussion of an anti-cyclical policy in 
Latin America 
The cycle is the typical form of economic growth under our present sys-
tem, and, although it is a general phenomenon which must be explained 
by a single theory, it manifests itself in a different way at the cyclical 
centres and at the periphery. 
Notwithstanding these differences, much has been written about the 
cycle at the centres, but very little regarding the periphery. The brief 
comments which follow are not an attempt to fill the gap, but an outline 
of some ideas on anti-cyclical policy which, if accepted in principle, 
could constitute a suitable basis for the discussion of the problem. If the 
discussion is not to take place on an abstract plane, the particular case 
of each country must be examined in order to determine whether its eco-
nomic structure and existing conditions make those ideas practicable or 
whether other ways of dealing with the cycle must be found. 
The firm intention of the United States Government to follow an anti-
cyclical policy is well known. It does not seem advisable, however, to 
rely exclusively upon measures taken by the principal cyclical centre, 
since in the case of a contraction in that country, firm action on the part 
of the peripheral countries could be very opportune. The Latin-American 
countries should, therefore, prepare to play their part in the common task. 
At the centres the policy resulting from this aim attempts to influence 
the volume of investments, which are considered the dynamic factor in 
economic fluctuations. This is not the case at the periphery. There exports 
are the dynamic factor, which is not surprising, since their fluctuations 
reflect those in income at the centres, which in turn are closely linked 
with investment. 
It is not, of course, within the power of the periphery to regulate 
exports in the same way that the centres propose to regulate investments.1 
Other means must therefore be sought of averting the more serious 
consequences of cycles on the internal activity of the Latin-American 
countries. In the first place, the idea that industrial development will in 
itself make them less vulnerable to these phenomena should be dismissed. 
For this to happen, exports would have to become a very small proportion 
i This refers to the impossibility of the Latin-American countries changing the pat-
tern of export fluctuations by their own actions, and not to the results that could be 
achieved through regulating export surpluses, to which reference is made at the end of 
this chapter. 
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of national income. In that case, a country would have already left the 
periphery and become a cyclical centre, and though it might thus have 
lessened its vulnerability to external influences, it would have developed 
those inherent characteristics of the system which give rise to the cyclical 
fluctuations of the centres. 
We are rather of the opinion that industrial development will bring 
out the consequences of the cycle more clearly, by accentuating fluctu-
ations in urban employment. In a country that is essentially agricultural, 
depressions manifest themselves more in the fall of rural income than in 
unemployment; indeed in many Latin-American countries during the 
great world depression, people who had previously gone to the cities to 
find work returned to the land. Unemployment was, so to speak, diluted. 
This cannot be expected when relatively large industrial masses are con-
centrated in the cities: in that case the cyclical unemployment problem 
would assume serious social complications. 
Does this lead to the conclusion that, from the cyclical point of view, 
industrialization has this disadvantage? It might be so if economic activity 
were left free to operate under its own forces. If it is not, however, indus-
trial development could be one of the most effective elements of an anti-
cyclical policy. 
Let us briefly examine the various possibilities: in one of them, perhaps 
the most wide-spread, an attempt is made to lessen or counteract the 
effects of export fluctuations on internal activity by means of a compensa-
tory policy in which investments, chiefly in public works, are made to 
vary in adverse ratio to the fluctuation in exports. This policy demands 
certain conditions. During the cyclical upswing, tax revenue increases and 
the market is favourable to the sale of public bonds. Nevertheless, the 
State should not only abstain from using these additional resources to 
increase public investments, but should restrict them in proportion to the 
increase in private employment. Thus during the upswing resources 
would be accumulated in anticipation of bad times or used to repay bank 
credit extended during the preceding contraction. At the mere mention 
of these requirements the difficulty of fulfilling them is apparent. For the 
very reason that the Latin-American countries are in full process of devel-
opment, their investment projects are always larger than can be carried 
out with the limited means available. To maintain that, when those 
means increase and the opportunity of carrying out such projects presents 
itself, the authorities instead of seizing it should accumulate resources for 
the future, which may be enjoyed by their successors, would mean mak-
ing the success of anti-cyclical action depend on attitudes not always 
compatible with sound political interest. 
There are yet other difficulties, among them the flexibility of plans. 
Investments must be alternately increased and restricted according to the 
cycle, and that is not an easy thing to do. Moreover, there would have 
to be a rapid transfer of people from the activities most affected by the 
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depression to those created by the new public investments. All this, if it 
does not lead to the exclusion of the possibility of anti-cyclical action, 
at least suggests the exploration of other means more suited to Latin 
America's individual characteristics. 
It is important that internal activity should develop at a high level of 
employment, despite the cyclical movement of exports. The way in which 
that movement causes internal activity to rise and fall is well known. 
When exports increase, so does internal demand, and with it employment 
and income; the rise in income brings about in turn a rise in imports, 
which thus tend, although with some lag, to adjust themselves to exports. 
This is the way the cyclical upswing develops in Latin America. The 
opposite occurs in the downswing: the fall of exports brings about a drop 
in income and employment, with a consequent reduction of imports. 
Let us now assume that in the course of these phenomena, internal 
activity has reached its lowest point. Employment has fallen with a cor-
responding reduction of income from a maximum of, let us say, 10,000 to 
a minimum of 7,500. Of this 7,500, twenty per cent, or 1,500, is spent on 
imports required in addition to local production to satisfy the current 
needs of the population, and the very low level to which exports were 
reduced barely suffices to pay for these imports. 
If, in order to increase employment and income to a maximum, a pol-
icy of expansion similar to that recommended in the great centres were 
followed, there would be an immediate increase in imports, providing 
the coefficient had not changed. Thus when income reached 10,000, 
imports would be at least 2,000, and if exports were maintained at a level 
close to 1,500, there would ensue a disequilibrium which would reduce 
monetary reserves to a very small amount in a relatively short time. 
It should be pointed out incidentally that similar difficulties are not 
likely to occur at the centre during the downswing, since that is pre-
cisely when they receive the inflow of gold from the peripheral countries. 
Without exceptional resources, it would not seem possible, therefore, 
to develop in these countries a policy of expansion tending to increase 
employment, and at the same time not reduce the import coefficient. 
The possibility of doing so is limited by obstacles which vary in impor-
tance from one country to another. Let us assume, for the sake of simpli-
fying the argument, that they have been overcome and that the coefficient 
has gradually been reduced from 20 to 15 per cent through tariff changes. 
This has enabled employment and income to expand without an increase 
in imports above the minimum of 1,500, the level at which exports are 
also maintained; in other words maximum employment has been achieved 
without disturbing the equilibrium of the balance of payments. 
Thus, owing to the reduction of the coefficient, the current needs of the 
population at this maximum level of employment can now be satisfied 
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with 500 less in imports. The problem has therefore been that of 
producing the difference internally, whether they were finished consumer 
goods or the raw materials essential to their manufacture. 
Not all consumption, however, can be satisfied by articles of immediate 
consumption or of comparatively short duration. As pointed out else-
where, technical progress in the great industrial countries has steadily 
created new needs for durable consumer goods which must be imported. 
These goods become indispensable as the standard of living rises. This 
does not mean, however, that the importation of such articles cannot be 
drastically reduced when the fall in exports hardly allows payment for 
essential imports. For the very reason that the goods are durable, it would 
seem possible to restrict importation of them to the extent required by 
the intensity of the downswing, if they have been freely imported in the 
preceding upswing. 
The same applies to capital goods. If it has been possible to meet 
requirements during the upswing, it will be possible to restrict tempo-
rarily their import during the downswing. In this connexion, it should 
be taken into account that with the reduction of the coefficient for articles 
and materials intended directly or indirectly to satisfy current needs, 
there will be a greater margin than before for the importation of both 
durable capital goods and durable consumer goods. 
Finally, there are non-essential goods satisfying current needs, which 
are imported in comparatively large quantities in times of prosperity; 
it is obvious that when foreign exchange is scarce importation of these 
can be reduced without serious consequences. 
In short, for the purposes of this policy, imports are divided into two 
categories. One covers those that cannot be deferred, and includes the 
articles and materials indispensable for achieving maximum employment 
with a minimum of exports and at the same time ensuring the satisfaction 
of current needs. The other includes imports of durable consumer or 
capital goods which are by nature deferable, as well as unessential goods 
for current consumption. 
Let us now continue with our example. The policy adopted had suc-
ceeded in bringing about maximum employment, but meanwhile exports 
had again increased under the influence of a new upswing. At the same 
time, the demand of primary products which had also fallen to its cyclical 
minimum, rose again in proportion to the rise in income caused by the 
increase in the value of exports. It is evident that where there is maxi-
mum employment, this increase in demand will inevitably cause a cor-
responding increase in imports. Prices will also rise, with a consequent 
increase in the profits of entrepreneurs, which in turn increases their 
demand and, through it, imports. 
Consequently the increase in income that ordinarily results from a rise 
in exports above the cyclical minimum will soon be transformed, in one 
way or another, into an increase in imports, without affecting the level of 
internal employment. 
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It must be remembered that the readjustment of the coefficient does not 
mean a reduction in imports. They will be of the same magnitude whether 
or not this anti-cyclical policy is followed, since they depend ultimately 
on exports and foreign investments. To reach the goal desired, it is only 
necessary to alter their composition. 
In other words, this change is as follows. When exports are at the 
cyclical minimum, a peripheral country can pay for only a comparatively 
small quantity of imports. That quantity is not sufficient to cover the 
imports required to maintain maximum employment. Hence it is neces-
sary to change the composition of imports and, with it, the structure and 
volume of internal production, in order to satisfy the current needs of 
the population while maintaining maximum employment. 
While exports remain at their minimum level, only goods essential for 
maintaining employment and current consumption can be imported. 
When, however, exports again increase with the upswing, the time will 
have come for the importation of the additional goods necessitated by 
the increase in demand. 
Thus while the imports essential to the satisfaction of the current needs 
of the population will follow the relatively slow rate of the organic growth 
of the country, deferable imports will remain subject to the fluctuation in 
exports. 
When it was explained above that a reduction in the coefficient of 
imports for current consumption was indispensable for the carrying out 
of an anti-cyclical policy, reference was made to the obstacles which would 
have to be overcome. These obstacles are of various types. 
In the first place, the substitution of internal production for imports 
usually requires the raising of tariffs, owing to the higher cost of internal 
production. From this point of view, there would be a loss in real income, 
but on the other hand, the loss in income resulting from cyclical fluctua-
tions in employment is usually very great. It is very probable that in most 
cases the collective gain from employment stability is much greater than 
the loss resulting from the higher cost of internal production. It is con-
ceivable, however, that the precariousness of natural resources and the 
inefficiency of workers or management might be such that the loss through 
increased costs would absorb an excessively large part of the increase in 
real income gained through greater employment. The seriousness of this 
difficulty cannot be denied. 
At the same time, the substitution of internal production for imports 
requires the importation of capital goods, and consequently the necessity 
of saving during the process of reducing the coefficient. Even if saving 
could be achieved internally, to import the capital goods it would be 
necessary to reduce still further the coefficient of imports for current con-
sumption, thus bringing about a further rise in the cost of living. Therein 
lies the second obstacle, one which could doubtless be partly removed 
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with the co-operation of international financial institutions, which would 
thus be able to show that their anti-cyclical measures, while aiding the 
peripheral countries, also help to maintain the demand for capital goods 
at the centres. 
Finally, an anti-cyclical policy of this kind might require transfers of 
productive factors that are not always easily carried out. However, as 
explained in another chapter, these difficulties could be lessened to a 
large extent by the increase of the population of working age and by the 
better utilization of the ill-employed. 
In Latin America, the lowest point on the curve of exports and foreign 
investments has been rising in succeeding cycles. This does not mean, 
however, that they may not fall to a level lower than in the preceding 
cycle; the phenomenon is unusual, but has been known to occur, as, for 
instance, during the great world depression. If it should happen again, 
a high level of employment could be maintained only to the extent to 
which monetary reserves were sufficient to cover the excess of essential 
import over minimum exports or in so far as the international lending 
agencies were able to achieve their anti-cyclical purpose.2 
The need for reducing imports of durable goods during the cyclical 
.downswing has already been pointed out. Is exchange control indispensa-
ble to achieve this? As has been seen, the increase in demand for such 
goods is chiefly the result of new income from increased exports; hence 
if there is no undue increase in that demand as a result of credit expan-
sion, there will be no need for restrictions, unless there should be a sharp 
drop in export prices in the cyclical downswing. Restrictive measures 
would be necessary only if the expansion were very great, or if minimum 
exports fell below the level of essential imports and there were no 
extraordinary resources to pay for them. 
In such a case, the alternatives are clear: either to reduce even more 
the coefficient for essential imports, the increase in protective tariffs 
implied placing an additional burden on the consumers, or deliberately 
to restrict imports of deferable articles by means of exchange control. 
It is easy to picture a country where a marked propensity to import 
non-essential articles might be incompatible with the high level of imports 
of capital goods needed for intensive economic development. Exchange 
control could then be an effective instrument of selection, without pre-
cluding other measures. 
For such special cases, one can envisage simple measures of control by 
which the distribution of import permits would be left to the free play 
of supply and demand, within the limits of the amount of exchange to 
be made available for such imports. 
2 In this connexion, see the remarks of Dr. Hermann Max in Significado de un Plan 
Marshall para América Latina. 
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On the other hand, it is obvious that if a country were to embark on a 
very easy credit policy, it would be compelled to choose between devalua-
tion or a system of exchange control which, while masking that deval-
uation, diverts it with an inflationary influence towards internal activity. 
An effective instrument of anti-cyclical policy would then become an 
instrument of inflationary policy. Actually, all measures of monetary 
policy may equally well be put to good or bad use. There would not even 
be the excuse of unemployment since, as maximum employment would 
have been already been achieved, there would be no valid reason to 
continue the credit expansion. 
Mention has already been made of the extreme case in which the cycli-
cal minimum of exports is insufficient to cover essential imports. This is 
where monetary reserves can fulfil their specific function. It is therefore 
an appropriate point at which to examine the matter. 
Reserves increase in the upswing and, in the downswing, lose a large 
part of that increase; the greater the previous credit expansion, the greater 
the loss incurred. This is easily comprehensible if it is remembered that 
in the peripheral countries imports generally lag behind exports. This, 
and the similar movement of other items in the balance of payments, 
causes receipts to exceed payments during the upswing, with a consequent 
inflow of gold and foreign exchange, while, in the downsing, the oppo-
site occurs. 
The theoretical explanation of this interesting process can be briefly 
recalled. The gold and foreign exchange that flowed in during the 
upswing tend to flow out again through the circulatory movement of 
the corresponding income. The foreign exchange that flows in as a result 
of an increase in exports, for instance, is closely related to an equivalent 
increase in income; this increase in income circulates internally and is 
transformed into other increases in income; but in each stage of this cir-
culatory process part of the increase becomes an additional demand for 
imports, so that the original amount is progressively reduced. Thus the 
inflowing foreign exchange tends to flow out again. The time lag before it 
flows out depends, among other things, on the magnitude of the import 
coefficient and other liability items. 
Other things being equal, the higher this coefficient, the sooner will 
exchange flow out. 
It should not be surprising that the outflow of foreign exchange from 
the Latin-American countries is imperceptible during the cyclical up-
swings, since the new exchange then flowing in exceeds, in the inter-
national accounts of a country, the exchange that flows out, and there is 
a net gold balance in favour of the country. In the downswing, when 
exports and other asset items decrease, the outflowing foreign exchange 
exceeds the inflowing, and monetary reserves thus lose part of the gold 
gained before. 
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At the end of each cycle there is thus a net increase in gold which rep-
resents the share of the country in the world distribution of new monetary 
metal production. The net increase is comparatively small and depends 
in the long run on the rate of economic growth of the country and on its 
coefficient of imports and other liability items in relation to the rest of 
the world. 
If the coefficients do not change, the country which has a higher rate 
of increase than most will tend to lose a part of the net increase in gold 
which it would otherwise have had; the more marked the difference in 
the rates of growth throughout cyclical fluctuations, the greater will be 
the loss in the net increase of gold. 
It could well happen that the gold added, in course of time, to the 
monetary reserves of a country would not be sufficient to offset the con-
sequences of a reduction in exports during an unusually deep depression. 
Clearly a reduction in the total import coefficient would help to retain a 
greater amount of gold in periods of prosperity, and the country would 
be better able to face such an eventuality. 
Additional monetary reserves could also be built up by means of sav-
ings; in so far as savings are not invested, a part of income in circulation 
is not transformed into imports and consequently does not give rise to 
an outflow of gold. The quantity of gold retained is equal to that of sav-
ings. This could be achieved, for instance, if the central bank were to 
issue bonds during the upswing and cancel the corresponding amount 
of money, which would again be put into circulation in the downswing; 
there would be an additional reserve equivalent to the money cancelled 
which, together with the existing reserves and the share in the world dis-
tribution of gold, could relieve monetary pressure if minimum exports 
should not be sufficient to cover essential imports. 
We realize that the building up of additional reserves by means of 
savings is not a very attractive solution to countries that need to import 
large quantities of capital goods. It is clear, however, that if a country 
were able to obtain international credit during a period of acute depres-
sion, it could use more gold during the upswing to import capital goods 
instead of retaining it as envisaged above. Such a possibility is, in fact, 
conceivable if a general anti-cyclical programme could be drawn up for 
the periphery whereby a country which had followed a sound policy 
could rely upon sufficient co-operation on the part of international insti-
tutions during the downswing. 
It is very understandable that while an inflationary process was devel-
oping at the principal centre, it was not considered advisable to aggravate 
it by granting international credit in excess of that required for the 
urgent needs of Europe. If, however, there were to be a contraction, the 
case would be different, and it would be the right moment to adopt a 
general anti-cyclical policy without the contradictions that would result 
from unilateral action by each one of the Latin-American countries. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA 57 
International action need not be limited to the field of credit. There 
are other effective ways of combating depression in the peripheral 
countries. There has been much discussion of the possibility of pur-
chasing the surpluses of primary production. It is well known that in the 
downswing agricultural production falls far less than that of industry. 
It is in the interest of both the centres and the periphery that it should 
not decline very much, since that would delay the recovery of the centres. 
It follows that a judicious policy of purchasing surpluses could be highly 
beneficial; the reduction in imports of primary producer countries would 
be less, in so far as the cyclical fall in exports could be checked and, con-
sequently, the reduction of demand in the industrial countries would 
also be smaller. 
This regulatory measure would have another advantage. The preven-
tion of an unduly large drop in the prices of primary products through 
such purchases would help to keep the relation between those of primary 
and finished products from continually turning against the peripheral 
countries in the way described earlier. 
The aforementioned tendency of agricultural production to decline far 
less than that of industry, or to decline hardly at all, was taken into con-
sideration earlier, when the bases for a discussion of an anti-cyclical 
policy were outlined. It was then assumed that the reduction of exports 
would cause a decline in income in primary production, but no reference 
was made to the possibility of rural unemployment. The downswing is 
reflected in a drop in prices rather than in a contraction of production, 
but as rural profits fall with the prices, so likewise do investments in agri-
culture, thus causing a certain amount of unemployment. 
Though, for the reasons given at the beginning of this chapter, a gen-
eral compensatory policy is not deemed practicable, this does not mean 
that there is no need for partial compensatory measures. Even with the 
effective application of an anti-cyclical policy fluctuation in some types 
of investments is inevitable. In fact, we have seen that an increase in the 
profits of entrepreneurs causes an increase in their imports of capital 
goods. The new equipment, however, calls for the construction of build-
ings and other improvements that absorb man-power during the upswing 
and releases it in the downswing, just as happens in the case of rural 
investments. 
This is not an unsurmountable obstacle. One of the specific advantages 
of not being obliged to follow a compensatory policy of public works 
and general investment is that of being able to plan steady development 
in accordance with the growing needs of the country and the amount of 
savings that can be used to satisfy them. The total amount of construc-
tion can thus increase from year to year without the acute fluctuations 
entailed by a compensatory policy. Partial readjustments would fit into 
this progressive development very well. For instance, mortgage loans for 
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private construction could be reduced during the upswing, in order to 
make available man-power for industrial construction, and during the 
downswing additional loans could be granted for construction and rural 
investments in general. 
The ideas expressed in this chapter are far from constituting a pro-
gramme of anti-cyclical policy. They are intended only to present the 
main aspects of the problem and to arouse discussion, while at the same 
time pointing out certain differences between cyclical behaviour at the 
centres and at the periphery which oblige the Latin-American countries 
to work out their own programme. 
Moreover, the exposition of the principal problems relating to the eco-
nomic development of Latin America would not have been complete 
without a consideration of anti-cyclical policy. It is an indispensable 
complement of a long-term economic development policy. As mentioned 
before, industry will bring out the vulnerability of the periphery to the 
fluctuations of the centre. It is not enough to increase productivity and 
thus absorb unemployed or ill-employed factors. Once productive employ-
ment has been achieved, steps must be taken to prevent a return of 
unemployment as a result of cyclical fluctuations. 
The two policies are compatible, however, not only as regards their 
ultimate aim, but also the means of achieving them. Both require a 
readjustment of the import coefficient. The anti-cyclical policy calls for 
it so that a country may continue to satisfy its current needs and to main-
tain maximum employment in spite of fluctuating exports. The industries 
and activities which satisfy those needs are precisely those which the 
Latin-American countries can establish with least difficulty, thanks to a 
market which expands as the rise in productivity increases consumption. 
If a country could achieve this objective, it would be in a position to 
endure bad times without detriment to current consumption and employ-
ment. It is not necessary for this purpose to force the creation of capital 
goods industries. If it could be accomplished by a high level of industrial 
development, technical skill and the accumulation of savings, it would 
certainly be an encouraging proof of maturity. There is no sound eco-
nomic reason for setting up capital goods industries, however, since there 
is still ample room for increasing the productivity of those producing 
for current consumption. 
From the standpoint of economic development, the maximum rise in 
the standard of living depends on productivity and this in turn depends 
to a great extent on the most efficient machines. At the same time, it is 
in durable consumer goods that technical progress continually offers new 
or improved articles. It would seem advisable, therefore, to import such 
articles as can be paid for by means of exports or, in the case of capital 
goods, by foreign investments, within a general programme of economic 
development. 
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Moreover, from the anti-cyclical viewpoint, the consequences of export 
fluctuations could be diverted to fall entirely upon the importation of 
these imports. 
All these are general considerations, which, by their very nature, can-
not be applied to particular cases. A country might undertake the estab-
lishment of durable goods industries during the initial stage of its indus-
trial development for special reasons, which would have to be carefully 
analysed. 
Here, as in many other cases, our knowledge of the economic structure 
of the Latin-American countries, their cyclical form of growth and their 
possibilities is limited. If a scientifically impartial investigation of such 
questions could be carried out and the training encouraged of economists 
capable of grasping new economic phenomena, foreseeing the problems 
involved and co-operating in the search for solutions, a service of incal-
culable value would be rendered to the economic development of Latin 
America. 

